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Preface 
Oath-taking is an integral part of my professional life; oaths are used almost as a tool 
of trade, and are accepted as guarantees of truth. Whilst there is now a statutory right 
to affirm, instead of to swear, an affirmation itself constitutes a formula, an 
asseveration to tell the truth. Zeeman J, in the case of R v Mansell decided in 1993, 
declined to accept evidence on oath from a child aged twelve years because he held 
inter alia that the child "[had] no notion of the nature or obligation of an oath in the 
sense that he [had] no understanding of what it is to swear to tell the truth or 
promising God to tell the truth and has no expectation that God will reward or punish 
in this world or the next".(1) Whilst His Honour's decision was overturned on appeal, 
the case demonstrates that oath-taking is fundamental to our legal system and its 
function in society. It is not only oaths in court proceedings though which are still the 
subject of debate; oaths of allegiance are also under scrutiny in the context of the so-
called Republican debate in this country. 
Montagu provides a definition of oath-taking which I adopt for the purposes of this 
paper, that oath-taking is "the legal procedure of calling down a curse upon oneself 
if one should deviate from what one has sworn to do or not to do... the desire of 
society to protect itself against the mendacity of the individual by causing him to call 
down upon himself the punishment of the Great Powers if he speak not the truth or 
keep not his bond." (2) Central to that definition, both in terms of oaths of allegiance 
and oaths in court proceedings, is the invocation of the divine sanction. It seems 
somewhat anomalous that oath-taking should still constitute a dilemma in a society 
which fits Professor Gilbert's criteria for being "post Christian". (3) 
1. R v Mansell A91/1993 p. 1. 
2. A. Montagu The Anatomy of Swearing  (1967) pp. 59-60. 
3. A.D. Gilbert The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of The Secularization of Modern 
Society (1980). 
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In this paper I seek to ascertain and analyse attitudes to oath-taking with particular 
reference to oaths in court proceedings and oaths of allegiance, in the crucible of the 
Civil War/Interregnum period in England. Did this time of national crisis., when 
allegiances were challenged, basic institutions threatened, and accepted truths re- 
, assessed, impact upon attitudes to oath-taking? Did oaths matter at all, and if so to 
whom? Was it possible to fulfil obligations under oath to the succession of king, 
Commonwealth, Protectorate and ultimately Charles II? Was oath-taking essentially 
a political necessity, or a question of conscience and an individual's relationship with 
God? Were obligations assumed under oath absolute or ambulatory? 
The paradox inherent in oath-taking, both in Civil War England and twentieth century 
Australia is encapsulated by Shakespeare in the passage from Titus Adronicus which 
opens the Introduction. Titus Adronicus was first printed in 1594, and although writing 
slightly earlier than the Civil War period, Shakespeare's works reflect a preoccupation 
with oaths and obligations thereunder; that preoccupation was obviously relevant and 
accessible to patrons of popular theatre in the late Elizabethan period. The balance 
of the Introduction provides a contextual overview of the state of religious belief in 
England in the Civil War period, and a selection of contemporary views as to the 
status of obligations under oath; it concludes with a consideration of interpretations 
of some current historians. Christopher Hill particularly postulates a view wherein 
changing seventeenth-century attitudes to oath-taking are consistent with his theory 
of the transition from a pre-industrial to a mercantilist society. 
Chapter 1 concentrates upon the political crisis of the Civil War and the attempt by the 
victors to establish the legality and constitutionality of their victory. At a most simplistic 
level, the Civil War itself brought into focus attitudes to obligations under oaths of 
allegiance; this focus was sharpened by subscription to the Solemn League and 
Covenant and the Engagement. Thomas Hobbes wrote his Leviathan during the 
upheaval of the Civil War/Interregnum period; it was published in mid 1651. A 
consideration of Hobbes' political theories as expounded in Leviathan is fundamental 
to this chapter. Notwithstanding Hobbes' ultimate conclusion of obligations under oath 
as ambulatory, and co-extensive with the power of the Sovereign, his was not a 
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simplistic rationalisation for changing sides as a matter of convenience. Parliament 
adopted his theories in practice, but there is also clear evidence of a felt need to 
justify attitudes to oath-taking (and breaking) in terms other than expediency. 
Chapter 2 is a consideration of the trial of Christopher Love, a Presbyterian Divine, 
executed in 1651 following a conviction for treason. The trial provides an interesting 
and enlightening source of contemporary attitudes to oath-taking; it marries both oaths 
in court proceedings (of necessity), and oaths of allegiance. Love's trial for treason in 
1651 was directly referrable to the Engagement controversy; his perception of his 
obligations under the Solemn League and Covenant as absolute, is in tension with 
the political theories and accommodations considered in Chapter 1. The tension 
between the ultimate political pragmatism identified in Chapter 1, and the "martyrdom" 
of Love, brings out the full range of attitudes to obligations under oath as ambulatory 
on the one hand and absolute on the other. 
The dichotomy is considered in Chapter 3 from the perspective of the Quakers, who 
like Love were prepared to face criminal and financial penalties to stay true to their 
religious imperatives. For the Quakers, the absolute nature of the obligation was to 
tell the truth; it existed independently of the oath. They, in common with Shakespeare 
and Hobbes recognised the paradox inherent in oath-taking, and they rejected the 
proposition that to subscribe an oath was preclusive of an independent consideration 
of truthfulness. Again though, there was nothing simplistic about seventeenth-century 
Quaker attitudes; it is evident that they too were aware of a tension between religious 
and political realities. 
Chapter 4 considers the mirror image of perjury, a necessary adjunct to any 
consideration of attitudes to oath-taking, particularly in terms of the response of the 
institutional authorities of Church and State. The chapter concludes with an 
assessment as to whether Hill has told the whole story, and whether a consideration 
of obligations under oath as ambulatory or absolute is in fact reducible in his terms to 
the operation of market forces. 
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Introduction 
Lucius 	Who should I swear by? thou believest no god: 
That granted, how canst thou believe an oath? 
Aaron 	What if I do not? as, indeed, I do not; 
Yet, for I know thou art religious, 
And hast a thing within thee called conscience, 
With twenty popish tricks and ceremonies, 
Which I have seen thee careful to observe, 
Therefore I urge thy oath; for that I know 
An idiot holds his bauble for a god. 
And keeps the oath which by that god he swears, 
To that I'll urge him: therefore thou shalt vow 
By that same god, what god soe'er it be, 
That thou adorest and hast in reverence, 
To save my boy, to nourish and bring him up; 
Or else I will discover naught to thee. (1) 
At one level the whole concept of oath-taking as a guarantee of truth involves a 
fundamental circularity, if not flat contradiction. Oaths are taken to "ensure" a certain 
behaviour, whether it be to tell the truth in judicial proceedings, or to subscribe a 
certain allegiance in social or political terms. (2) Logically, if a person appreciates the 
1. W. Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus, Act 5 Scene 1. 
2. Hill cites "a learned member of the Assembly of Divines" in a declaration against the 
Anabaptists "[oaths] are necessary for the execution of the magistrate's office and the 
preservation of human society. For without such oaths the commonwealth hath no surety upon 
public officers and ministers: nor kings upon their subjects; nor lords upon their tenants; neither 
can men's titles be cleared in causes civil, nor justice done in causes criminal; nor dangerous 
plots and conspiracies be discovered against the state". Daniel Featly The Dippers Dipt (1646) 
p.142 from C. Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary Enpland (1964) p. 383. 
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distinction between truth and falsehood, and understanding concepts of loyalty accepts 
them as intrinsically good and right, a superadded formulation of words should be 
superfluous. Similarly, if a person does not have those perceptions, or having them, 
chooses to act to the contrary, is it feasible or reasonable to posit the view that what 
could be described as an incantation renders such contrary behaviour impossible or 
unlikely? (3) Notwithstanding that Shakespeare identified this essential paradox, he 
replicated the orthodoxy that oaths are complete guarantees. Lucius had invited Aaron 
to "Tell on thy mind, I say thy child shall live." Aaron though would not proceed until 
Lucius swore to that effect. 
Aaron accepted the efficacy of the oath because it bound Lucius, the subscriber of it. 
It was Lucius who believed and was religious, so Lucius' conscience would (apparently 
ipso facto) be bound. Aaron's non belief was irrelevant. The irony though, is that Aaron 
who avowedly did not believe, and who mocked and denounced as popish the 
observable ceremonies of religion (and oath-taking) accepted as self-evident that a 
person swearing by a god (any god) in whom he believed would unquestionably tell 
the truth. Lucius swore by his god, and Aaron disclosed his secret. 
The Lucius/Aaron encounter resulted in an orthodox outcome - that oaths really are 
a guarantee of truth, but Shakespeare's reservations may be seen again in Henry V 
"Trust none: For oaths are straws, men's faiths are wafer-cakes..." (4) a sentiment 
echoed by Thomas Hobbes "Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no 
3. Rev. Richard Ward expressed the same doubt "both magistrates and those who are wronged 
[should be] very careful not to constrain any offender to swear, if by any other means the matter 
may be known or decided... If he whom we desire should be put to his oath fear the Lord, then 
he dare no more lie than forswear himself... If he fear not the Lord, then how will he fear to 
forswear himself?" ibid p. 404. Hill goes on to say that Laud's licenser thought this "was 
dangerous doctrine". 
4. Shakespeare, King Henry V Act 2 Scene 3. Hill expresses the view that "Almost any of 
Shakespeare's Histories could be quoted to illustrate the crucial importance atached to oaths". 
ibid p. 395. 
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strength to secure a man at all". (5) For Hobbes it is fear of punishment which 
ensures performance. Clearly though, scepticism was not universal. Sir Edwin Sandys 
expressed the view that "the sacred, the sovereign instrument of justice among men, 
what is it, what can it be in this world (emphasis mine) but an oath, being the 
strongest bond of conscience?" (6) Ralegh, whom Hill describes as "not.., strictly 
veracious when on oath at his trial for high treason" subscribed to the orthodox (and 
socially repressive) view that "oaths defend "the life of man, the estates of men, the 
faith of subjects to kings, of servants to their masters, of vassals to their lords, of 
wives to their husbands, and of children to their parents, and ... all trials of right" (7) 
The debate of these individuals is a barometer for the concerns and preoccupations 
of English society in the late Elizabethan, early Stuart, and Civil War periods. The 
extent to which this is so is evidenced by the disparity of sources - Shakespeare as 
representative of the Elizabethan popular theatre; Hobbes a serious political theorist 
coming to terms with the reality of power structures in the context of civil war; Sandys 
a business man; and Ralegh a poet, explorer, court favourite and traitor. Obligations 
under oath obviously mattered enough to be the subject of debate. The dilemma 
inherent in oath-taking required resolution; a requisite brought into focus in the national 
crisis of Civil War. 
The attempts to reconcile such obligations with conscience imperatives cannot be 
dismissed as merely the product of a less enlightened or more religious (or 
superstitious) age, although seventeenth-century England was both an intensely 
religious age, and an "intensely legalistic society". (8) Brailsford goes so far as to 
5. T. Hobbes, Leviathan Ch 17 p. 223. All references to Leviathan in this and succeeding 
chapters are taken from the Penguin Classics Edition, 1968. See too the views of S. Butler, 
in Hudibras (1664), "Oaths are but words, and words, but wind". 
6. E. Sandys, Europae Speculum p. 45 see Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 395. 
7. Ralegh, History of the World 1614 (1820 Edition) II pp. 416-19 from ibid. 
8. M. Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England 1570-1640 (1987) p. 328. 
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describe the "Revolutionaries" as "This God-intoxicated generation", (9) and according 
to Richard Baxter, admittedly writing from a Puritan, and hardly dispassionate 
perspective, it was "principally the differences about religious matters that filled up the 
Parliament's armies and put the resolution and valour into their soldiers", 
notwithstanding it was, on his assessment, "public safety and liberty" which motivated 
"the nobility and gentry". (10) Religious and legalistic (constitutional) imperatives were 
fused in the event of Civil War; a debate as to whether obligations under oath were 
absolute or ambulatory was necessary, maybe inevitable. 
What may loosely be described as the Civil War/Interregnum period covered a wide 
spectrum of religious orientations, and provided (admittedly from time to time and in 
varying degrees) a measure of toleration for different expressions of Christian 
precepts. The description "intensely religious" is not a simplistic assertion of universal 
belief, but rather a recognition that religion was a "live issue", evidence of which is 
curiously provided by the negative proposition that a significant number of people 
chose to reject Church structures and teachings. The truth of this apparent paradox 
has been recognised by a number of modern historians. 
Ingram states that the "vast majority of people in this period were at least nominally 
conforming members of the established church" (11), and uses the illuminating 
description of "a broad spectrum of unspectacular orthodoxy".,(12) He recognises the 
force, though, of Keith Thomas' findings in his book Religion and the Decline of Magic 
that "commitment to the church and official religion was minimal among large sections 
of the common people in... seventeenth-century England. Not only were religious 
ignorance and indifference widespread, but there also existed strong undercurrents of 
9. H. N. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution (1961) p. 31. 
10. M. Sylvester, (ed.) Reliquiae Baxterianae, or Richard Baxter's Narratives of the Most Memorable 
Passages of his Life and Times  (1696) part i, p.31: from M. R. Watts, The Dissenters (1978) 
p. 106. 
11. Ingram, Church Courts p. 92. 
12. ibid p. 94. 
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thought which, if not wholly atheistic, were strongly sceptical of basic Christian 
doctrines and could lead to a virtual rejection of all religion. Hence the orthodoxies of 
the national church were seriously challenged by magic, astrology and other non-
religious systems of belief." (13) 
Fulbrook agrees with Thomas that "a large proportion of the population [in pre-
Revolutionary England] was prepared pragmatically to accept, with degrees of 
understanding and approval, whatever religious settlement was in force. The relatively 
large number of people - as much as 1/6th or 1/5th of the population in some places - 
who were prepared to remain excommunicate indicates the disregard of many for the 
spiritual sanctions of the Church. The existence of religious indifference (though 
probably not active atheism at this time)... is simple and ready evidence of a lack of 
general consensus on religion." (14) On these findings, maybe Aaron should have 
feared for his son. 
The sanction standing behind oath-taking is essentially a divine one; "the universal 
belief in the existence of God, and in an after-life in which rewards and punishments 
are to be expected". (15) As seen in the Preface, the theory of the divine sanction 
remains a necessary concomitant of a valid and binding oath. Bishop Tillotson, in his 
contemporary pamphlet "The Lawfulness and Obligation of Oaths" (1681) went further 
though, and stated that "the obligation of an oath "reaches to the most secret and 
hidden practices of men, and takes hold of them when no law can"(16) 
Zeeman J. in R v Mansell was of the view that "the reality [in twentieth-century 
Australian society] is that many adults do not understand the nature of the oath, but 
13. ibid p. 93. 
14. M. Fulbrook, "Legitimation Crises and the Early Modern State: the Politics of Religious 
Toleration" - in K. von Greyerz, (ed.), Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe 1500 - 
1800 p. 153. 
15. Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 396. 
16. ibid p. 416. 
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they are sworn without inquiry". (17) The extent to which "ordinary" people in 
seventeenth-century England knew of divine sanction theory is unclear. Hill cites the 
Tryal (sic) of John Lilburne as authority for the proposition that "in 1649 a judge could 
take it for granted that members of a London jury had often functioned as jurors 
before, and that there was no need to explain to them the sacredness of an oath." (18) 
Ingram, on the other hand, refers to the case of "Edward Somerode, a 24-year-old 
cobbler from Broughton Gifford who was called as a witness in 1617, confessed that 
"he received the communion at Easter last but was never taught the catechism...[and] 
knoweth not what an oath is or what punishment is appointed for those that swear 
falsely." (19) He goes on to say though that "such lamentable ignorance was very 
rarely shown to exist", acknowledging that "the poorest and most ignorant folk were 
least likely to be called as witnesses". He refers to Philip Smith, who whilst not brilliant 
at mathematics, (20) "was able to give a fair account of the spiritual consequences of 
taking a false oath, and could repeat the Lord's Prayer". (21) 
Notwithstanding religious diversity, albeit within an essentially Christian context, oath-
taking seems to have been endemic in seventeenth-century English society (22). The 
widespread use of the ex officio oath (which will not be considered in any detail in this 
paper) and the vehement opposition it aroused, particularly from Puritans and common 
lawyers, both of whom it may be conceded had a vested interest, are evidence that 
17. R v Mansell supra p. 4. 
18. Hill, op cit p. 387. 
19. Ingram, Church Courts pp. 97-8. 
20. He could evidently calculate how many groats made a shilling, but did not know how many 
were in three shillings ibid p. 98. 
21. ibid. One can't help feeling a certain scepticism as to the "fairness" of Smith's account, 
however the perception that basic calculus should be easier to grasp than divine sanction 
theory may in itself be a reflection of a more secular age. 
22. The Book of Oaths and the severall formes thereof  published (anonymously) in 1649 "contained 
416 pages of oaths which a man might have to take (or had in the past taken) (emphasis mine) 
ranging from the oaths of jurors to the Solemn League and Covenant." See Hill, Society and 
Puritanism p. 387. 
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the "bishops realized the effectiveness of the oath as a weapon." (23) Hill cites a 
Puritan Petition to Parliament dated 1586, in which it was said that the oath ex officio 
"to a conscience that feareth God (emphasis mine) is more violent than any rack to 
constrain him to utter that he knoweth, though it be against himself and to his most 
grievous punishment." (24) 
Maguire concludes though that Puritans did have a philosophical basis for their 
opposition to the ex officio oath. "[They] protested against its use not only because 
it was the most effective method ever devised of searching out their wayward acts and 
erroneous opinions but also because they sincerely believed that forcing a man to 
incriminate himself was against common law principles and the liberty of the subject". 
(25) The Puritans thus recognised that "the inquisitorial method of procedure is best 
adapted to the needs of social repression". (26) 
Christopher Hill identifies the corollary of the proposition that oaths were used as an 
illegitimate arm of what was (in effect) a totalitarian regime, "the rejection of oaths 
contain[ed] an important social protest... refusal to swear was an act of anarchism". 
(27) He in part explains the non-compliance of churchwardens with the terms of their 
obligations, for example, as a defence of "the community's liberty against the 
23. M. H. Maguire, "Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio As Administered in the 
Ecclesiastical Courts in England" in Essays in History and Political Theory in Honour of C.H.  
Mcllwain p. 209. 
24. Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 384. 
25. op cit p. 228. Somewhat ironically, Marchant points out that the ex officio oath had actually 
been initiated to make it more difficult for private accusers - to guard against malice. 
See R. A. Marchant, The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York 1560-1642 
13 . 7 . 
26. Maguire, op cit p. 216. See too Brailsford, "Whenever confession is regarded as the ideal form 
of proof which every officer of justice is bent on achieving, not all of them will resist the 
temptation to use illegitimate forms of pressure..." The Levellers And The Enqlish Revolution 
p. 82. 
27. Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 383. 
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inquisitorial central power, even when the hierarchy would regard this as "wilful, 
common and execrable perjury". (28) 
Quite apart from the ex officio oath, there is evidence that oath-taking was 
manipulated by those in power: "It was one of the privileges of peers that their word 
of honour was accepted in lieu of an oath, and therefore they were excused from 
swearing in court." (29) There is absolutely no justification in principle for this 
exemption; indeed, in the context of oaths of political allegiance in times of such 
volatility, it was patently self serving. 
Ingram lends support to the proposition that the rigours of oath-taking were a matter 
of social status. He cites the case of William Marshman in 1639 who told the Court 
which had excommunicated him for refusing to take the ex officio oath that "he never 
knew any rich man cited to this court though they go to plough, [on Sunday?] or 
commit any other offences". (30) 
Hill argues that attitudes to oaths in seventeenth-century England were symptomatic 
of a society in transition, from a medieval "semi- magical" world wherein the priest 
mediated between God and man inter alia by oaths and release from them (as a form 
almost of sacrament), to a commercial and mercantile world wherein an oath was no 
more sacred than a promise, (31) and it was the individual and that individual's 
conscience that determined behaviour. "Supernatural sanctions became less 
necessary in a society in which honesty was manifestly the best policy, in which those 
who did not keep their covenants made were apt to have difficulties in business 
28. ibid p. 392. 
29. ibid p. 408. Hill identifies the Test Act of 1673 as the first occasion on which an oath was 
statutorily demanded of peers. 
30. Ingram, Church Courts p. 331. 
31. See Hill op cit p. 397 incorporating reference to Tyndale,  Expositions of Scripture pp. 56-7. 
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relationships... If I cannot take his word, I'll not take his oath." (32) His conclusion is 
that "in this society oaths lost their force because self-interest obliged.., the 
supernatural sanction backing the oath of loyalty and the judicial oath - God the 
supreme overlord - was succeeded in capitalist society by the discovery that it paid 
a man to make his word his bond because of the rise in social importance of credit, 
reputation, respectability." (33) Whether Hill's conclusion is valid and exhaustive 
remains an open question for consideration throughout the balance of this paper. 
32. ibid p. 399 and pp. 413-4. The medieval world view on the other hand was that only a fool 
would accept "a man's bare word not on oath: it is the child's "Oh, but I didn't promise!" 
ibid pp. 396-7. 
33. ibid pp. 417-18. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Political Crisis 
Considerations of credit, reputation and respectability did not feature in Hobbes' 
assessment of obligations under oath, although his thesis may be cited in support of 
Hill's pragmatic view that "men keep their covenants made because it is to their 
mutual advantage to do so." (1) Hobbes accepted that seventeenth-century English 
society was in transition, but it was a transition born of the political crisis of the Civil 
War, not a stage in Hill's continuum from a medieval to a capitalist society. The 
crucial issue for Hobbes, and for Parliament, was to identify the content of obligations 
under oath, particularly oaths of allegiance, within the context of a Civil War which 
"seemed to most members of Parliament an appalling, incomprehensible breach of the 
natural order of things, perhaps a prelude to social dissolution." (2) 
Hobbes believed that the conflict entailed by each individual's pursuit of power could 
only be averted, and individual self interest maximized, by cession of each individuals' 
power to a sovereign entity. His was not the simple proposition though that obedience 
to the sovereign equates with self interest; rather Hobbes believed there is a point at 
which obedience is no longer appropriate nor justified, and at that point, it is (virtually) 
a moral imperative to withdraw obedience. (3) It may be seen that Hobbes' theory was 
dangerous in practice - it must have been virtually impossible, in the flux of shifting 
fortunes and allegiances of Civil War England, to discern one's personal advantage 
with any degree of certainty. 
1. Hill, 	Society and Puritanism p. 497. 
2. B. Worden, The Rump Parliament 1648-1653 (1974) P.  13. 
3 	"The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than 
the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them". T. Hobbes, Leviathan p. 272. For 
Gauthier, "Hobbes' concepts are practical, moral in so far as "moral" means "practical", 
"concerning what to do", but not in so far as "moral" means "opposed or superior to prudential." 
The LOCliC of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes  (1969) p. 28. 
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Whether or not it was from an acceptance of Hobbes' political theory, or whether they 
genuinely believed that the king had been manipulated and misled by evil counsellors, 
the simple fact must be recognised that those who fought for Parliament, at least in 
the first Civil War, broke their oaths of allegiance to Charles I. "The lines that divided 
classes and parties were fluid and a surprisingly long list can be compiled of important . 
politicians and soldiers who changed sides during the struggle." (4) The decision to 
breach that oath of allegiance to Charles I was a serious one, a rejection not only of 
the absolute nature of obligations under oath, but of accepted political structures. 
Charles I maintained in "The King's Reasons for Declining the Jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Justice" that "the authority of obedience unto Kings is clearly warranted, and 
strictly commanded in both the Old and New Testament." (5) Parliament "put.. .forth... 
a claim to sovereignty really incompatible with kingship." (6) 
Significantly there is evidence of a felt need by those in opposition to the king to find 
justification for their breach. The evidence does not support an assertion that oaths 
of allegiance were considered outmoded, and that political expediency or self interest 
had become the sole (and legitimate) determinants of action. Thomas maintains that 
the "successive imposition of ... the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), and the 
Engagement to the Commonwealth (1650) created acute dilemmas about the 
compatibility of each with its predecessor and of all with the Oaths of Allegiance and 
Supremacy to the Crown. In the process all the old 'Jesuitical' doctrines about 
equivocation, mental reservation, and dissimulation, supposedly unique to papists, 
were resurrected and strenuously employed against those who took a more rigorist 
view of such obligations; and much was made of the linguistic indeterminacy of all 
verbal agreements." (7) 
4. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution pp. 13-14. "In all men might have had 
to take up to ten... conflicting oaths of loyalty between 1640 and 1660, to say nothing of the 
counter-swearing of the Restoration. And this does not include oaths of secrecy..." 
Hill, Society and Puritanism 	pp. 409-10. 
5. Quoted from S. R. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1628- 
1660 (1889) p. 285. 
6. !bid introduction p. xxxiv. 
7 	K. Thomas, "Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England" in J. Morrill, P. Slack, & 
D. Woolf Public Duty and Private Conscience (1993) p. 43. 
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Somewhat illogically, those who had broken (or chosen not to follow) oaths of 
allegiance to Charles I demanded oaths of allegiance in their turn. What seems even 
more ironic is that the possibility of a peaceful political solution between Independents 
and Presbyterians was precluded because of Presbyterian insistence upon adherence 
to the Solemn League and Covenant. It is as if there was an hierarchy of oaths - some 
oaths of allegiance could be negated, others were truly binding. 
Aylmer is correct in his observation that "any revolutionary government, which comes 
to power by extra-constitutional means, has to win recognition of its own authority. 
This was particularly so with revolutionaries who were most reluctant to admit [within 
the context of a legalistic age] that they had ever acted illegally, or unconstitutionally". 
(8) Hence "there was a need... for a theory of political obligation in terms of which the 
new government might be legitimated... [that] it might be shown not merely to be 
beneficial to submit but in some way compatible with... loyalty to... existing oaths and 
obligations." (9) 
The Solemn League and Covenant was taken by the House of Commons in 
September 1643. Significantly though, it is expressed as an all-encompassing pact 
between "noblemen, barons, knights, gentlemen, citizens, burgesses, ministers of the 
Gospel, and commons of all sorts in the kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland 
[who] have (now at last) ... for the preservation of ourselves and our religion from utter 
ruin and destruction.., resolved and determined to enter into a mutual and solemn 
league and covenant." Its preamble reads that it was "for Reformation and Defence 
of Religion, the honour and happiness of the King..." (10) Clause 1 dealt with the 
"preservation of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland... [and] the reformation 
8. G. E. Aylmer (ed.), The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement 1646-1660  (1972) P.  10. 
See too Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 409. "An oath of allegiance was the means of bringing 
home national political transformations to the masses of the population, of involving them to 
some extent as participators. Each of the Governments which came to power in England in the 
revolutionary years tried to buttress its position by securing national subscription to an oath". 
9. Q. Skinner, "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy" in 
Aylmer, The Quest for Settlement pp. 79 and 83. 
10. "The Solemn League and Covenant" in Gardiner, Constitutional Documents p. 187. 
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of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland." (11) Clause 2 rededicated the 
subscribers to the "extirpation of Popery, prelacy... and whatsoever shall be found to 
be contrary to sound doctrine..." (12) The third clause is that which precluded any later 
political settlement "we shall with the same sincerity, reality and constancy... 
endeavour.., to preserve and defend the King's Majesty's person and authority.., we 
have no thoughts or intentions to diminish His Majesty's just power and greatness". 
(13) 
The covenant was "[made] in the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all 
hearts, with a true intention to perform the same, as we shall answer at that Great Day 
when the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed..." (14) - a clear invocation of the 
divine sanction. Clause 2 of the propositions of Uxbridge and Clause 2 of the 
propositions of Newcastle called for the king to become a signatory to the Covenant. 
(15) 
The king in his "Letter of Charles Ito the Speaker of the House of Lords" in November 
1647 declined to abolish episcopacy, citing as his reasons that as a Christian he was 
satisfied that it was a system instituted by the Apostles, and "as a King at his 
coronation he hath... taken a solemn oath to maintain this order [and] His Majesty and 
his predecessors... have inseparably woven the right of the Church into the liberty of 
the subjects..." (16) It seems, though, that oaths were to an extent ambulatory for 
kings also, as Charles felt able to reinterpret that obligation to the extent that "they 
[bishops] exercise no act of jurisdiction or ordination.., without the consent of their 
Presbyters, and [would] consent that their powers in all things be so limited, that they 
11. ibid pp. 187-8. 
12. ibid p. 188. 
13 	ibid. 
14. ibid p. 190. 
15. Interestingly, Lilburne, a Leveller, "felt obliged to refuse an offer of a high command, for once 
more the Covenant stood in his way. This oath, which troubled many an honest soldier, 
required loyalty to Genevan orthodoxy as well as to King Charles - if any man could reconcile 
these incompatibles". Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution p. 89. 
16. "Letter of Charles Ito the Speaker of the House of Lords" op cit 	pp. 243-4. 
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be not grievous to the tender consciences of others". (17) Indeed, though, the king's 
apparently flexible attitude to obligations assumed under oath was not without support. 
Brailsford says that the (Anglican) bishops "who kept his conscience over the 
unpalatable prospect of tolerating Puritan dissent" advised Charles that "after giving 
his promise of toleration [the principle involved should not be limited merely to that] 
under pressure of necessity, he might with the church's blessing, break it ... so soon 
as he "regained the power given him by God". (18) The bishops also advised 
Charles that there was a distinction between his public and private consciences. (19) 
The king evidently went so far in 1646 as to avail himself of the (Jesuitical) doctrine 
of mental reservation, asking "whether I may with a safe conscience give way to this 
proposed temporary compliance [to abolish episcopacy], with a resolution to recover 
and maintain that doctrine and discipline where I have been bred." (20) By December 
1647 Charles had entered an Engagement with the Scots to the effect that "as soon 
as he [could] with freedom, honour and safety be present in a free Parliament [he 
would] confirm the said League and Covenant by Act of Parliament." (21) The 
alliance with the Scots precipitated the Second Civil War. 
In his letter to the House of Lords, Charles had agreed to "consent to an Act of 
Parliament for the suppressing and making null all Oaths, Declarations and 
Proclamations against both or either House of Parliament, and of all indictments and 
other proceedings against any persons for adhering unto them". The mechanism 
suggested was an "Act of Oblivion to extend to all his subjects". (22) After his 
17. 	ibid p. 244. 
18 	The Levellers and the English Revolution  p. 249. It is conceded that the word used is 
"promise", qualitatively different from "oath", however it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
promise would have been encapsulated in the form of an oath, and thus that the established 
church extended to oaths the argument of duress. 
19 	See Thomas, "Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England" p. 33. 
20 	ibid p. 33 citing State Papers Collected by the Earl of Clarendon vol ii pp. 265-8. 
21. "The Engagement Between the King and the Scots" 
From Gardiner, Constitutional Documents p. 259. 
22. "Letter of Charles I to the Speaker of the House of Lords" ibid p. 246. 
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execution, Parliament in "The Act Abolishing the Office of King" March 17th, 1649 
"enacted and ordained.., that all the people of England and Ireland... of what degree 
or condition soever, are discharged of all fealty, homage, and allegiance which is or 
shall be pretended to be due unto any of the issue and posterity of the said late King, 
or any claiming under him." (23) 
Charles therefore accepted the proposition that there could be release from the 
obligations of an oath - he did not claim for himself the ability to release from the 
divine sanction by virtue of being appointed by God, but said rather that he would 
consent to an Act of Parliament. There is no indication whence Parliament was to 
obtain jurisdiction to nullify oaths. It is almost as if oaths had become contractual 
obligations, which could be consensually released. (24) 
Parliament in its "Act Abolishing the Office of King" certainly claimed to exercise the 
right which Charles had earlier acknowledged. Interestingly though, the discharge from 
oaths of allegiance accorded by Parliament was prospective only - it was not an 
absolution from breach of the oath of allegiance to Charles I. Rather, Parliament chose 
to found its jurisdiction in breaching its obligation to Charles I upon a "just and lawful" 
condemnation of him for treason, by which "his issue and posterity, and all others 
pretending title under him, are become incapable of the said Crowns [of England, 
Ireland and the territories and dominions thereunto belonging]". (25) There was no 
shrinking from the proposition that Charles was lawfully king, in fact the charge against 
him admitted it. (26) 
23. "The Act Abolishing the Office of King" ibid p. 294. 
24. Hobbes saw obligation to the Sovereign power once instituted in terms of contract, from which 
the subject was released if the Sovereign could no longer provide adequate protection. Even 
as the subject was released from the obligation, so he must automatically have been released 
from the oath; the oath in any event added nothing to the obligation. See Leviathan p. 272. 
25. op cit p. 294. 
26. See "The Charge Against the King" ibid p. 282. "That the said Charles Stuart, being admitted 
King of England..." 
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Hobbes took the view that "men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because... [history] 
make[s] it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call 
him Tyrant". (27) Hobbes, though, does not really lend support for a theory of 
sovereignty as a form of contract initially entered into on arms length terms between 
the sovereign power and the subject. Rather the contract, for Hobbes, is "onely of one 
to another, and not of him [the Sovereign] to any of them; there can happen no breach 
of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne... that he which is made Soveraigne maketh 
no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make 
it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall 
Covenant with every man". (28) 
"By 1647 Parliament had been split. On the one side were the Presbyterians, who 
were attempting to organise an Erastian Presbyterianism in England, and whose 
principle was to substitute the predominance of Parliament in Church and State for 
that of the King. On the other side were the Independents, who wished to introduce 
a larger, if not a complete toleration, and thus to liberate individual consciences from 
the control both of Parliament and King. As the Independents had a great hold upon 
the Army, the Presbyterians, who in the beginning of 1647 commanded a majority in 
both Houses, had strong reasons for falling back on the King." (29) Perhaps therefore, 
it is not as singular as it first might appear, that the Presbyterians, who in common 
with all other opponents of the king had by their participation in the first Civil War 
acted in breach of their oaths of allegiance, refused to "forswear" themselves by 
subscribing the Engagement. 
The Engagement is dated 2nd January 1649/50. "Whereas divers dis-affected 
persons, do by sundry ways and means oppose and endeavour to undermine the 
Peace of the Nation under this present Government so that unless special care be 
27. 	Hobbes, Leviathan p. 369. 
28 	ibid p. 230. 
29. 	Gardiner, Constitutional Documents 	Introduction p. xlvii. 
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taken, a new War is likely to break forth: For the preventing whereof, and also for the 
better uniting of this Nation... The Parliament now assembled do Enact and Ordain... 
That all men whatsoever within the Commonwealth of England, of the age of eighteen 
years and upwards, shall... take and subscribe this Engagement... viz I Do declare and 
promise, That I will be true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England, as it is now 
Established, without a King or House of Lords." (30) It may be seen that Worden is 
right in his assessment that the Engagement was "far from divisive in its intentions" 
(31) - quite apart from the stated aim of uniting the nation, the tone is inclusive. The 
irony is inescapable too, that the obligation was not to swear (32) allegiance - it was 
really (apparently) a minimalist obligation. (33) 
Further irony is identified by Worden, that "the Cavaliers, the principle (sic) target of 
the Engagement, were widely reported to have taken it without heed or scruple, a 
circumstance which offered no guarantee of their future loyalty. "Such oaths as are 
over-hastily swallowed," a newswriter commented "are the most easily vomited up 
again"." (34) Ministers, though, "found in their former subscription to the Solemn 
League and Covenant an insuperable objection to taking the Engagement".(35) 
30. "The Engagement" in Firth and Rait, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 
Vol 2 P.  325. 
31. Worden, The Rump Parliament 1648-1653 p. 227. 
32. This distinction was appreciated at the time. In correspondence between Thomas Washbourne 
and Robert Sanderson, January 1650, it was recognised that "[The Engagement] is only a 
promise, not an oath, and consequently not so obliging the conscience, but only.., whilst the 
State stands in force" See Hill, Society and Puritanism 	p. 410. 
33. That may be so as a matter of legal and political theory, but there were significant civil 
penalties/impediments if the Engagement was not taken. For example, it was a precondition to 
"hold or enjoy any Place or Office of Trust or Profit, or any Place of Imployment of publique 
Trust whatsoever" and failure to subscribe resulted in forfeiture of office, distress and sale of 
goods and imprisonment. See Firth and Rait Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642- 
1660 Vol 2 pp. 325-6. 
34 	INorden, The Rump Parliament 1648-1653 p. 231. See too the attitude of the Levellers; 
Walwyn, Overton and Prince upon their release from the Tower in November 1649 signed the 
Engagement which "they promised to keep as faithfully as Bradshaw, Vane or Prideaux kept 
the Covenant". See Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution  p. 603. 
35. 	Worden, op cit p. 232. 
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The Engagement issue sparked a plethora of pamphlets, and it was in this context that 
Hobbes' political theory was used virtually as propaganda. Those seeking to validate 
the Parliamentary regime essentially relied upon a more subtle version of the "might 
is right" principle. "We must obey whatever powers are in a position to command our 
obedience. And the reason is that their capacity to rule is in itself a sufficient sign of 
God's will and providence". (36) As Skinner points out, this argument was vulnerable 
to a different interpretation of Scripture "that lawfully invested authority ... is... alone... 
ordained of God, though God may well permit many forms of tyranny to exist." (37) 
Hence the obligation to obey de facto power was "vindicated less by citing God's 
providence than by stressing the needs of political society, and specifically man's 
paramount need for protection from himself and his fellow men." (38) Skinner identifies 
a confluence of these ideas, of whom the most notable exponent was Hobbes. (39) 
Hill is of the view that "the more contradictory oaths men took, the less bound they felt 
by any of them." (40) He well illustrates the point by citing a Royalist song - 
"They force us to take 
Two oaths, but we'll make 
A third, that we ne'er meant to keep 'ern". (41) 
For Hobbes, "the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a Covenant, if lawful!, 
binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it: if unlawful!, bindeth not 
36. Skinner "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement Controversy" 
in Aylmer (ed.), The Quest for Settlement p. 83. Of course, this view would justify obedience 
to every regime that exists from time to time, including Nazi Germany. 
37. ibid p. 84. 
38. ibid p. 87. 
39. C. B. MacPherson, too, in his introduction to Leviathan states that "the received picture of 
Hobbes as an isolated thinker, rejected by his contemporaries, without influence in his own 
time... and thus outside the mainstream of political thought in the seventeenth century, is false". 
p. 23. 
40. Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 411. 
41. ibid p. 411 citing Rump; or an Exact Collection of the Choycest Poems and Songs Relating to 
the Late Times (1662) Volume 1 p. 235. 
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at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath" (42) The royalist preparedness to take the 
Engagement may in itself have been an endorsement of this view. They believed that 
the covenant was unlawful. Thus it "bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an 
Oath". The Presbyterians though, had recanted their initial breach of allegiance to the 
king, and held themselves bound by the Solemn League and Covenant. (43) That 
insistence was referrable primarily to their religious imperatives, but the elements of 
mutuality and compact cannot be ignored. 
For Hobbes "the State is the sole interpreter of all laws, spiritual and profane. God's 
commandments are transmitted through the mouth of the civil power... In the last 
analysis, the State itself is deified, for its authority destroys any personal responsibility, 
even in religious matters." (44) The Presbyterians though, as signatories to the 
Solemn League and Covenant, resisted the Engagement, and did not accept the 
pragmatism of the Hobbesian (Parliamentary) position. 
42. 	Hobbes, Leviathan p. 201. 
43 	There is some justification for the view that there is a valid distinction to be drawn between the 
allegiance to Charles I which must have been tacitly expressed, almost as an incident of 
citizenship, and the Solemn League and Covenant which was actually subscribed. See Hobbes, 
"For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a 
Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave". Leviathan p. 218. 
44. 	The New Cambridge Modern History  (1961) Volume V p. 104. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Love Trial 
"Did not our worthies of the House, 
Before they broke the peace break vows? 
For having freed us, first, from both 
Th' allegiance and supremacy oath, 
Did they not, next, compel the nation 
To take, and break, the Protestation? 
To swear, and after to recant, 
The Solemn League and Covenant? 
To take th' Engagement and disclaim it, 
Enforced by those who first did frame it?" (1) 
Samuel Butler's tone is flippant and cynical. Born in 1618, and dying in 1680, his adult 
life coincided with the Civil War/Interregnum and Restoration periods. His experience 
of the political crisis and Parliamentary reaction to it left him with a view of obligations 
under oath as at best ambulatory. Oaths for him, lost whatever magic they may once 
have held as guarantees of truth; they became a gambit for the casuists, and a 
subject of mockery. A consideration of the trial of Christopher Love in 1651, (2) 
though, serves to demonstrate that Butler's flippancy and cynicism were not universally 
shared. Love's trial provides us with a significant contemporary insight into attitudes 
to both the judicial oath and oaths of allegiance; it is a microcosm for the larger 
Engagement controversy. 
1. S. Butler, Hudibras p. 133 from Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 409. 
2. The Trial of Mr Christopher Love  State Trials 188 p. 43. 
(Page references in this chapter unless shown otherwise are from this source). 
23 
Worden suggests that in the heated political environment of the Rump's increasing 
conservatism and reaction to religious radicalism, the war in Scotland, and speculation 
of Royalist plots, "Love's case soon came to symbolise the conflict between on the 
one hand those for whom Pride's Purge and the execution of the king had been 
merely the starting point of the godly reformation, and for whom there could be no 
going back to the 1640s, and on the other all those who were anxious to heal the 
wounds of the parliamentary cause". (3) 
Love was brought to trial in 1651 for high treason against the Commonwealth, accused 
of involvement in the so called Presbyterian plot, (4) the allegation being that he "as 
a false Traitor and Enemy of this Commonwealth and Free State of England, and out 
of a traiterous and wicked Design to stir up a new and bloody War, and to raise 
Insurrections, Seditions and Rebellions within this Nation, did in several days and 
times, that is to say, in the years of our Lord 1648, 1649, 1650, 1651, at London, and 
at divers other places within this Commonwealth of England... traitorously and 
maliciously combine, confederate, and complot, contrive and endeavour to stir and 
raise up Forces against the present Government of this Nation, since the same hath 
been settled in a Commonwealth and Free State, without a King and House of Lords, 
and for the Subversion and Alteration of the same..." (5) 
Whilst the charge continued at length, the gist of the allegation was that Love had 
been in contact with the Scots, and involved with them in plots against the Army and 
Parliament for the restoration of Charles I. Further, it was alleged that after the 
execution of the King, Love had been in contact with Charles II who was in exile on 
the Continent, and particularly with respect to the Treaty of Breda. (6) According to 
3. VVorden, The Rump Parliament 1648-1653  P.  244. VVorden goes so far as to say that "the 
significance of the Love episode has not... been adequately appreciated". p. 243. 
4. See \Norden p. 243. It should be noted, too, that "Love... had been in trouble with the 
[Commonwealth] regime before, and had received every warning". p. 244. 
5. pp. 45-6. 
6 	"Prince Charles completed at Breda the negotiations by which he bought the support of the 
Scots for the recovery of his English crown... he signed the ominous treaty which subjected 
King and kingdom alike to the Solemn League and Covenant". Brailsford, The Levellers and 
- the English Revolution p. 606. 
24 
the testimony of Major Alford "the substance of it [the alleged Treason] was to press 
the Prince to apply himself to take the Covenant, and to prosecute the ends of it, and 
to cast off all his cavaliering party about him, which had brought so much mischief to 
his father, and would do the like to him". (7) 
The account of the trial discloses Love as a somewhat pedantic personality, constantly 
claiming ignorance of legal institutions, before launching into yet another dispute upon 
legal or quasi legal grounds; (8) his constant justification was that "he was on trial for 
his life". (9) His somewhat invidious position did not earn him any sympathy; rather, 
it was itself the subject of adverse comment, due in part to the Lord President's 
equation of the law of God with the law of England. "There is no law in England, but 
is as really and truly the law of God as any Scripture-phrase that is by consequence 
from the very texts of Scripture.. .whatsoever is not consonant to Scripture in the law 
of England, is not the law of England.. .And therefore to profess you are knowing in the 
laws of God, and yet to be ignorant of the laws of England... is not to your 
commendation, nor to any of your profession.., we must walk in them [the laws of 
England which are the laws of God] as we would walk to heaven." (10) 
Some important personal details are revealed by the transcript. From his rather moving 
speech delivered from the scaffold, it may be discerned that Love was born in Wales, 
of "mean parentage", and was apparently 35 years old (11). Of primary significance 
though was Love's profession/status as a Presbyterian Minister of the Gospel. (12) 
7. p. 89. 
8. Note the Lord President's somewhat dry comment "He pleads he is ignorant of the Law, and 
yet can make use of it". p. 51. 
9. See for example p. 51. "I am to plead for my life". 
10 	p. 172 & p. 238. 
11. "I am a man of an obscure family, of mean parentage... born in an obscure country (in Wales)" 
p. 262. Love was converted in his 15th year, and "for these 20 years God hath kept me". 
p. 262. The Dictionary of National Biography though, puts Love's birth in 1618, making him 33 
years old at the date of his execution in 1651; it puts his place of birth as Cardiff. 
12. He described himself as "the first minister in England try'd for treason." p. 165. 
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The prosecuting Attorney-General in fact alleged that Love was the leader (or one of 
a cabal) of a Presbyterian party, (13) although he seemed at pains to avoid any 
implication that Love was being prosecuted (persecuted) because of his religious 
adherence. He also sought not to unduly antagonise Love's co-religionists - "That the 
Presbyterian name was made use of, you have had many concurrent evidences;... 
And if it be a fault [the meetings alleged as evidence of Treason]... it is... done to the 
Presbyterian party, who, I am sure, will not own him in it. (14)... [The alleged Treason] 
was undertook in the name of a Presbyterian party; though I think, and do believe it, 
for very many honest Presbyterians, that they would spit in his face, if he should say 
it of them." (15) Notwithstanding the Attorney-General's diligence, Worden says that 
Vane saw Love's case "as a purely political one" and that Hammond "did not 
exaggerate the widespread determination to use the Love case as a means of 
reconciling presbyterians and independents... Love would never have died at 
parliament's hands for his religious views alone. He was executed, at a time of acute 
political danger, for political misdemeanours." (16) 
It could perhaps be argued, given the peculiar political circumstances, that any use of 
the trial as a case study of attitudes to obligations under oath in seventeenth-century 
England is unrepresentative. Such a dismissal would, however, be unjustified, as 
insight into attitudes to oaths comes from all participants: Love, the prosecution 
counsel, the Bench, the respective witnesses, and the interchange between them. The 
13. "[Love] pretends (emphasis mine) so boldly to represent... the presbyterian party". p. 74 
The designation of persons of Presbyterian sympathies into a party has been a notion 
subsequently challenged by historians, but in any event, Presbyterians were a grouping in a 
relationship of polarity with the Independents. See VVorden p.6. Brailsford says that "the 
ultimate distinction between the Presbyterian and Independent parties in England may have 
been, to put it crudely, that between the arrived and the arriving". The Levellers and the English 
Revolution p. 23. See too p. 548. 
14. p.201. 
15. p. 171. This concern to ensure that (in the modern aphorism) not only must justice be done, 
it must be seem to be done, recalls the earlier (1649) trial of Lilburne, similarly brought 
under the Treason Acts. See generally, D. Veall, The Popular Movement For Law Reform  
1640 -1660 (1970) pp. 163-4: 
16. See INorden, The Rump Parliament 1648 - 1653 pp. 244, 246 and 248 respectively. 
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Lord President (whose identity is disclosed in the transcript as Judge Keble) (17) in 
fact put the case in a Christian context in his early efforts to rebut Love's argument for 
counsel, by stating "we are men of conscience, and have souls to save as well as 
you... if we do not know that God is here present, we are the miserablest creatures in 
the world". (18) The Bench were triers of fact and law, sitting as judge and jury, 
although their participation in "interrogating" Love and commenting on the evidence 
jars modern ears and seems indicative of bias. (19) 
The apparent prejudices, though, are illustrative. Both the Lord President and the 
Attorney-General (the leading Commonwealth Prosecutor) had concerns that Love 
may approach the oath and his evidence like "The Romish Ministers.. .[whose] faith is 
faction [and] whose religion is rebellion.., they pray for strife, and fast for strife (20) 
...that [he] would evade things with mental reservations, and say and unsay at the bar, 
as high as any Jesuit can do". (21) Love was assured though that he should "have 
Justice as well as ever any jesuit had;" (22) one suspects this assurance provided less 
than total comfort. 
There was constant adverse reference throughout the trial to the Jesuit attitude to 
oath-taking. Essentially, it was thought that their evidence under oath could not be 
regarded as trustworthy, although as Hill recognises, "the horror of the Jesuit doctrine 
of equivocation.., only theorized what some Puritans of necessity had to do when put 
17. See p. 171 - the same judge who tried Lilburne in 1649. See Veall p. 163 ff. Curiously though, 
Veall says at p. 153 that Lord Commissioner Lisle presided over the Love trial, and it is clear 
he means the 1651 trial. 
18. p. 62. This reads as an echo of Lilburne's trial. See Brailsford, The Levellers and the English 
Revolution p.589. 
19. See Veall p. 18 ff. "This was an inquisitorial examination [specifically referring here to pre-trial 
examination]; the magistrate or judge did not act judicially, but as a detective drawing up the 
case against the accused. The purpose of the examination was to expose a man assumed to 
be guilty". 
20. p. 74. 
21. p. 62 . 
22. p. 76. 
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on oath". (23) That Anglican Bishops could accommodate an argument of duress as 
a defence to breaking an obligation assumed under oath (at least when the subject 
was the king), has already been noted. Notwithstanding that as a matter of practice 
the Jesuits were not alone in their attitude to oath-taking, it was against the Jesuits, 
and by extension all Roman Catholics, that opprobrium was levelled, by even such 
eminent jurists as Coke. When referring to those views in 1744, Lord Chief Justice 
Willes CB in Omichund v Barker described them as haying been formulated in "very 
bigotted Popish times". (24) 
A more balanced explanation of the perception of the Jesuit position was given by 
Martin B in Miller v Salomons. The issue for determination in that case, decided in 
1852, was whether a Jew, elected as a Member of the House of Commons, could 
lawfully take up his seat given his refusal to subscribe the concluding words of the 
requisite oath of office, "upon the true faith of a Christian". The decision itself is not 
relevant to this paper, but the case accords detailed consideration of precedent, and 
particularly the Jesuit position. It identified that the prevailing idea in mid seventeenth-
century England was "that Roman Catholics were in a different condition with regard 
to oaths from persons of other religious denominations; and that the Jesuits taught 
that the Pope had power to grant absolution from oaths, and to dispense with the 
performance of and adherence to them, and that Roman Catholics... made... oaths 
with mental evasions and secret reservations, which were supposed to have the effect 
of nullifying their obligation". (25) 
According to the judgment of Alderson B in the same case, the Jesuitical theory could 
be traced back to a "Treatise on Equivocation" found in the chamber of one of the 
conspirators in the Gunpowder Plot, Francis Tresham, that "a person... may lawfully 
equivocate, by using ambiguous words, or reserving mentally a sense of the words 
23. Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 395. 
24. Omichund v Barker Willes 539 @ 542 - decided February 1744. 
25. Miller v Salomons 7 EX 475 @ 518. 
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used different from that outwardly expressed by him, without incurring the sin of lying 
or the guilt of perjury.., that he may equivocate and mentally reserve without danger 
to his soul". (26) Jesuit casuistry makes a mockery of any notion of obligations under 
oath as absolute. The extent to which this was so may be seen from the example 
given by St. Alfonso de Liguori, an eighteenth-century casuist, that "I say no" in reply 
to a question to which one believes the correct answer is "yes" is a truthful response, 
as the speaker does in fact say "no". (27) This end point of casuistry rendered the 
whole concept of obligations under oath meaningless, and casuistry as a system of 
thought was ultimately condemned by Pope Innocent XI in 1679. 
The Love trial discloses unanimity between prosecutor, accused, witnesses and 
judiciary that they and the proceedings of which they were part were being conducted 
in the presence of God. That such was openly and repeatedly stated is in itself a 
significant point of departure from a modern trial. The assertion/acceptance of God's 
presence was not only reiterated many times by all involved, but the assertions were 
made in such circumstances as to imply that they were offered as a guarantee of 
truth. Love "[would] not lie for [his] life"; (28) his protestations of innocence were 
expressly made "in the presence of God". (29) 
The Lord President's charge to the first witness, Captain Potter, was that "You are 
upon your oath, (30) and in the presence of God, than whom there is no higher upon 
26. ibid p. 536. See too Thomas, "Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England" 
p. 32. 
27. J. P. Sommerville, "The 'New Art of Lying': Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry" 
in E. Leites, (ed.), Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe  (1988) p. 182. 
28. p. 62. 
29. See for example p. 75. "I [Love] do declare and protest ... in the presence of ... God... I 
never ... " 
30. The form of oath tendered by the Clerk to Captain Potter was "standard" and fundamentally 
familiar to modern ears."The evidence you shall give between the Keepers of the Liberties of 
England and the prisoner at the bar, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. So help you God. [He is sworn]" p. 76. The form of oath tendered to subsequent 
witnesses is not reported, although it seems a reasonable assumption that this formula 
remained uniform. 
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the earth, that is in the seat of justice... Now look upon the God of Truth, and speak 
the truth." (31) From the outset, Captain Potter's evidence disclosed a consciousness 
of the oath, although it is plausible that his consciousness was convenient, as he used 
it as a reason to decline to give certain evidence; he like later witnesses was a co-
conspirator with Love. Potter was for example, reluctant to swear to the truth of 
hearsay: "I have taken an oath to speak the whole truth in this business; but that is 
the truth I know. I desire I may not be pressed to things that I have only heard." (32) 
Whilst this comment seems a useful prevarication in reliance upon the words of the 
oath, Potter's answer to the Attorney-General's production of his examination (pre-trial 
proof of evidence) disclosed a genuine concern: "I intreat this may be remembered, 
which I premised at first, I had a latitude then [pre-trial], that I have not now: I am now 
upon my oath, and desire to be true to my own conscience, and to the state, and to 
this gentleman." (33) Potter clearly saw a distinction between his pre-trial statement 
and the sworn evidence he was asked to give at trial, a distinction he described as a 
"latitude". When pressed, Potter referred to the "oath I have taken (and I desire to 
speak it in God's presence)..." (34) 
The parenthetical comment does not add anything in legal theory to the substance and 
power of the oath taken, nor the reliability and truth of the evidence given, but it does 
serve to emphasise an awareness of the divine presence (and hence sanction) as a 
real and intrinsically awesome thing, and a guarantee of truth. Potter stated that "no 
man shall so far tamper with me, as to make me say an untruth," (35) going so far as 
to say, perhaps again for emphasis, "I profess, if it had been to save my life, I could 
not affirm [certain allegations]...". (36) 
31. pp. 77 and 76 respectively. 
32. p. 77, but note Veall's comment that "there were no rules about the admissibility of evidence 
at the trial... Hearsay evidence was accepted. The confessions of accomplices were admitted 
against each other and were looked upon as decisive evidence". p. 19. 
33. p. 80. 
34. p. 81. 
35. p. 81. 
36. P 88. 
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Potter's steadfast refusal to "swear upon demand", and repeated references to pre-trial 
latitude and in-trial conscience placed him in what he himself saw as an invidious 
position vis a vis the prosecutor and court. Nevertheless this immediate antagonism, 
and its potentially dangerous, or at least adverse, consequences, were risked in 
preference to giving evidence under oath that Potter did not believe to be true. "I 
[Potter] am afraid I give offence by saying, I think, and I heard, and that I cannot 
speak positively" (37) That the risk so perceived by Potter was a real one is 
evidenced by the Attorney-General's comments that "this man [Potter] must not 
escape unpunished, if for no other fault but this, to accuse a man before authority, and 
when he comes to his oath, to deny every word of it". (38) 
The evidence given by Major Adams disclosed a similar reticence. His evidence was 
consistently qualified. "I cannot say it upon my oath". (39) His reticence was more 
than a "desire to be cautious", (40) although one would reasonably assume that was 
part of it. He "dare[d] not swear" (41) certain propositions which were put to him. It 
was not that he dared not accept the purport of what the Attorney-General put to him, 
nor that he sought to evade self-incrimination; he quite readily accepted the substance 
of the evidence. Rather, he declined to "swear it in these words; but to this purpose 
it was"... (42) "No, I will not swear that; and upon my oath I cannot". (43) 
The tenor of Adams' evidence is not that he sought to evade the facts, nor confuse 
the issue. The impression of him is rather of a very truthful person, genuinely 
concerned about the status of what he said. His refusal to swear to certain 
37. p. 84. 
38. p. 88. 
39. For example see p. 103. 
40. p. 105. 
41. See for example p. 105. 
42. p. 105. 
43. p. 110. The witness, Captain Far, used the same language - there were matters to which he 
could not swear, for example, "I am upon my oath, and to say positively, I cannot". p. 128. 
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propositions, even whilst accepting the substance, was put in strong language - "dare 
not", "cannot". "Dare" is a particularly strong word (44) and imports an element of fear 
- what to fear but the divine sanction; the secular sanction was at the time not a strong 
deterrent; perjury for a first offence being only a misdemeanor. (45). 
Master Jaquel was "called into the Court, and the Clerk tendered him his oath; and Mr 
Jaquel spake to the Court to this purpose: That there were many oaths abroad, and 
he could not tell what to say to them; and he desired to be excused." (46) Whilst the 
reference to the plethora of "oaths abroad" hints at religious (Quaker) reasons for him 
declining to swear, it is not clear that Jaquel's reluctance had its basis in religious 
principle. In any event, it seems apparent that he was a Presbyterian; he was a co-
conspirator. 
Jaquel advanced legal rather than religious reasons for refusing to swear - that since 
he was himself a co-accused, he was not a competent witness and "durst not in 
conscience swear against Mr Love." (47) Whether or not he was a competent witness 
would have been a matter of law for the Bench to decide, and the Lord President in 
fact pressed him to swear. Curiously though, Jaquel said "he would speak the truth 
of what he knew, as well as if he was under an oath" (48) but nevertheless declined 
to swear. Given there is no further elaboration as to the reason for this claimed 
distinction, Jaquel's statement seems non-sensical - if he was prepared to tell the truth 
about matters concerning his co-accused (and implicitly waive the privilege against 
self-incrimination) why not swear to the truth he told? 
44. 	The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "dare" in terms of "venture (to) have the courage 
or impudence (to)... attempt, take the risk of ...defy (person)... challenge (person)..." 
45 	Cambridge Modern History Vol V p. 313. 
46. p. 113. 
47. p. 113. 
48. p. 113. 
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The Court was unmoved by the subtleties of his position, and fined him £500 for 
refusing to swear. (49) He was asked again to swear and "when the oath was read 
to him, did not swear in that manner as the other witnesses did, but only put his hand 
to his buttons". (50) When asked by Love whether he was under an oath "he 
answered that he was as good as under an oath". (51) The Court, still unaccepting of 
the distinction he sought to draw, pressed him "and then he did say he was sworn, 
and was under oath". (52) This certainly has nuances of the bizarre, and the detail 
about him touching his buttons is mystifying. It appears he did not ever subscribe the 
oath in any form of words, but under pressure said he was sworn. The touching of the 
buttons preceded his statement that he was sworn; it is at least open to infer that the 
touching of buttons was done as a form of oath. 
It may be that Jaquel was putting his hand, not so much on histuttons, but on his 
heart. (53) Brailsford relates an incident wherein Cromwell apparently did the same 
"with his hand upon his breast: In the presence of Almighty God, before whom he 
stood, [he said] that he knew the Army would disband and lay down their arms at their 
door, whensoever they should command them." (54) In this context, the placing of 
Cromwell's hand upon his heart/breast seems to have been for emphasis of the gravity 
and truth of what he declared; it may have been a form of invocation of the divine 
sanction. Whilst the inference is open that Jaquel was subscribing an idiosyncratic 
form of oath, given Love's later claims, it seems difficult to accept that Jaquel's 
49. 	Veall gives an approximate equation of money values as at 1969, by multiplying the 
seventeenth century figure by twenty. Of course in 1994 the multiple must be significantly more. 
The equation is "very rough" (per Veal!) but shows the seriousness with which refusal to swear 
was viewed. Some context is provided in that a £500 fine was also frequently imposed by the 
Court of High Commission for adultery. Veall p. 8. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. I am grateful to Professor Bennett for this suggestion. 
54. The Levellers and the English Revolution p. 192. 
p. 113. 
p. 113. 
p. 113. 
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placing of his hand upon his heart/buttons was in fact the subscription of an oath 
binding upon his conscience; if it was intended to be, he should have so identified it. 
Further, if he was prepared to take that as a form of oath, his refusal to subscribe in 
the standard form seems difficult to understand. 
Jaquel's evidence was "profess[ed] in the presence of God",(55) but Love was not 
satisfied as to the status of that evidence - "I would ask.. .Whether he hath spoken this 
as a mere relation, or whether he owns all this he hath spoken, as under an oath."(56) 
The Attorney-General's response was that "[Jaquel] did say, he was under an oath", 
(57) to which Love replied "If he say so, I am concluded". (58) This interchange is 
significant. It shows that the Attorney-General accepted the witness' statement as to 
the status of his evidence. (59) More striking, Love accepted the same proposition. 
(60) It seems all parties involved held the view that an oath was too serious (sacred) 
an obligation for challenge to be made to an (apparently) bona fide statement that a 
person regarded himself as sworn. 
Notwithstanding Love's apparent acceptance that Jaquel was sworn, he sought in his 
defence to exclude Jaquel's evidence in its entirety on the basis that he was "no legal 
Witness; for he did declare he could not in conscience take an oath against me... If 
55. p. 119. 
56. p. 120. 
57 	p. 120. 
58. p. 120. 
59. Whilst this may prima facie seem expedient, it would not in fact have been self-serving. The 
Court had stated at the outset that "if he [Jaquel] did not swear, what he should say could not 
be received as any thing in matter of Evidence". p. 113. 
60. The same instant acceptance that a person would not dissemble about oaths and evidence 
given thereunder was accorded by the Lord President in response to one of Major Adams' 
refusals to swear; (Adams) "No, I will not swear that; and upon my oath I cannot." (Lord 
President) "Will you not? I will press you to nothing." p. 110. 
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any person, good or bad, come under an oath, I must stand or fall by his testimony; 
and, according to God's ordinance, an oath is to decide all controversies". (61) Love 
thus declared an acceptance of the proposition that an oath is conclusive evidence 
of the truth of the statements made, regardless of the character of the person sworn. 
He went further though, and asserted that an oath derived its conclusive character 
from the laws of God. 
His submission, therefore, was that Jaquel had not committed himself to truth, as he 
had not taken an oath; or in the alternative, if he had, it was from "fearing his fine .... 
though with much seeming regret of conscience." (62) Love refrained however, from 
developing two possible arguments; first, that Jaquel's oath, given under apparent 
duress, was somehow invalidated, and secondly, that there was an irregularity of form 
sufficient to render the oath invalid. Rather he relied upon "inform[ation] that he [Mr 
Jaquel] denies that he was under an oath." (63) 
Whilst Love's submission, therefore, contradicted his initial acceptance of the status 
of Jaquel's evidence, he showed an entirely consistent preparedness to accept a 
subjective test as to whether, as a matter of fact, an oath had been taken such as to 
bind the conscience of the particular individual. He argued that on the facts of 
Jaquel's denial (that he was under oath) an oath had not been validly taken, and the 
evidence should thus be excluded and treated only as a "bare relation and naked 
information." (64) 
In Love's last, somewhat desperate attempts towards the end of the trial to discredit 
the proceedings, he referred again to Jaquel as a "Witness [who] said, he could not 
61. p. 154. 
62. p. 154. 
63 p. 154. 
64. p. 154. 
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in conscience, [swear] and did not swear till he was threatened, nay, fined by you, and 
drawn out of the court" (65) This cannot be taken as an abandonment of his earlier 
position that Jaquel was not sworn at all. In response to the Attorney-General's 
defence of the court's actions in punishing Jaquel for refusing to swear, describing 
Jaquel's conscience as one, "well-wrought upon", (66) Love replied "He is not under 
an oath to this day, he hath declared it himself.., he did but put his hand upon his 
buttons". (67) Again, Love consistently tested the existence and efficacy of an oath 
by reference to the subjective declarations of the individual concerned, whether in fact 
that individual considered his conscience bound. He obviously did not accept the 
proposition that touching buttons was in itself a valid oath, albeit in unconventional 
form. 
Love's reiterations that Jaquel was not sworn were categorised by the Lord President 
as "very uncivil and indiscreet". (68) The Lord President had clearly lost his patience. 
Nevertheless his rejection of Love's proposition had its basis in principle. "We have 
heard all this .... before ... that he was saying ... he was not under an oath: it was 
said so again and again, and again... "Are you under an oath? till at last he did 
conclude and testify (emphasis mine) he was under an oath (69). I testify this before 
all the company here, this is noised abroad again by many people, the care we had 
of that very man you speak of; you asked him three or four times then, and at the last, 
upon the conclusion, he confessed himself he was under an oath: he did not do as 
you do; you will say things are truth, but you will not speak those truths before God 
65. pp. 244-5. 
66. p. 245. 
67. pp. 245-6. 
68. p. 246. 
69. Again, the test accepted by the Lord President as conclusive, is a subjective one; he accepts 
Jaquel's testimony (oath) that he was under oath. 
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in a testimonial way." (70) The ever present prejudice resurfaced "though some of 
your witnesses that proved it, said it was true in the presence of God, what they gave 
under their hands: these men that do thus, are no better than Jesuits in reality, though 
not in name". (71) 
Master Jackson, whom the transcript advises was a Minister, dared not swear. (72) 
"I look upon this man as a man very precious in God's sight; and, my lord, I fear I 
should have an hell in my conscience unto my dying day, if I should speak anything 
that should be circumstantially prejudicial to his life; And in regard of these terrors of 
the Lord upon me, I dare not speak." (73) Having Love's death on his conscience was 
Jackson's stated fear. He evidently believed the nexus to be that if he subscribed his 
oath, he would be obliged to tell the truth, and Love would be convicted. 
It is clear that the status of an oath for Jackson was that it had the divine sanction 
behind it. The Lord President, perhaps recognising the reality of God (or perhaps 
taking this for granted as part of the milieu in which the trial was conducted) asked 
Jackson "Are you a professor of Jesus Christ, a minister of God? The great errand 
you are sent hither about, is to speak the truth from him. Therefore lay your hand upon 
your heart, (emphasis mine) (74) and do as becomes you as a Christian, and as a 
rational man, and as one that will tell truth; for by the truth the world stands. We are 
70. P. 246. There is no evidence that Love was afforded the opportunity to swear, although, note 
Veall's comments that "the accused had great latitude in what he was allowed to say". p. 20. 
71. p. 246. 
72. It is clear that Jackson was a Presbyterian Minister, not only from the fact that he was a co- 
accused. Rather, the evidence comes from the Lord President, in reply to Love's allegation that 
Jaquel had been importuned "you say we threatened [the witnesses]; true that we did threaten 
some; and I think we went thus far, that if [Jaquel] would not [swear], we would set £500 fine 
upon his head; but he would none of that, but came in again, and delivered his knowledge. But 
you had another of your own robe too  (emphasis mine) that came in, and would not testify." 
p. 247. 
73. p. 132. 
74. Surely not necessary for subscription of a valid oath, but very interesting in the light of Jaquel's 
behaviour. 
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all no better than savage men, if we have not judgment to tell truth." (75) Jackson 
acknowledged that he "look[ed] to die" "and trust[ed] in Jesus Christ [he] shall live 
again". (76) 
Jackson clearly had a well developed view of the divine sanction; he remained 
obdurate and would not swear. He was fined £500 and imprisoned. The Lord 
President's somewhat dismissive conclusion was that "you are the men that were 
spoken of before, Jesuits and priests: They say you are none, but you are their 
brethren". The Attorney General sought to press the advantage, "My lord, these go 
beyond Jesuits: The Jesuits will swear with a reservation, and these will not swear at 
all". (77) A view of obligations under oath as ambulatory, or idiosyncratic, was for the 
Attorney-General preferable to a perception of obligation as absolute, and a total 
refusal to compromise. 
Not surprisingly, Love in his defence set out to discredit the evidence and witnesses 
against him. (78) He claimed, for example, an inconsistency between the evidence 
of Far and Alford, not laying account for the discrepancies upon "the badness of Far's 
conscience, but upon the badness of his memory. (79) I do not think he is such an 
atheist, to swear falsly deliberately; but being asked so many questions as he was .... 
75 	p. 133. "To conceal a truth, or tell a lie, you had better let the world fall about your ears." 
p. 133. Is concealment of truth also to be made subject to the divine sanction? See Dymond's 
comments in "Oaths; their Moral Character, And Effects" infra @ p. 9 "does the oath bind.., to 
give an exact narrative of every particular connected with the matter in question, whether asked 
or not? If it does, multitudes commit perjury". 
76 	p. 133. 
77. pp. 133 - 134. 
78. Love did not call any witnesses himself. It is difficult though to reconcile the Lord President's 
(adverse) comment to Love that "[the Bench] expected you would have brought new witnesses" 
(p. 203) with Veall's statement of procedure that "the prisoner was not allowed to call any 
witnesses." The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640-1660  p. 19. 
79. Love made this distinction with respect to much of the testimony he sought to discredit. With 
respect to Major Alford, though, he went further and claimed "that for Alford's affirming that it 
was agreed upon among us, lam sure, if he had any conscience (emphasis mine), he could 
not say that I agreed to it." p. 140. The point is not developed, however it seems that Love's 
allegation is not the mild one that Alford was mistaken, but rather that he was lying (under 
oath); evidence that he had no conscience. 
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he might easily say he knew not what". (80) The equation is unequivocal - to lie under 
oath ("swear falsly deliberately") could only be the act of an atheist, one who by 
definition did not/could not believe that the divine sanction stood behind the judicial 
oath. (81) 
Love's substantive defence was presented without benefit of counsel. "The refusal to 
allow the prisoner to be legally represented on questions of fact was justified by the 
contention that, to secure a conviction, the proof should be so evident that no lawyer 
could argue against it; further, legal representation was unnecessary since the court 
was counsel for the prisoner." (82) Legal representation was available "if the accused 
could convince the court that there was a point of law to be argued." (83) 
Love's submissions as to the lack of credibility of witnesses and evidence are 
interspersed throughout with his own evidence; principally, and significantly, denials 
made "in the presence of God". Love himself though was never sworn - his evidence 
was not given on oath. Notwithstanding the absence of the formality of an oath, he 
called constantly upon God as witness to the truth of his assertions, and by implication 
acknowledged a divine sanction as a guarantee of truth. (84) This is in contrast to 
Love's challenge to "evidence" given by the Attorney-General at the very outset of the 
80. p. 139. 
81. Love refers not to an atheist per se, but to such an atheist. Notwithstanding the seeming logical 
impossibility of degrees of atheism, it is clear that lying under oath was regarded as 
reprehensible behaviour, inconsistent with belief in God; the "sinne of all sinnes". A. Hill, The 
Crie of England (1595) p.32  quoted by M. Hunter, "The Problem of 'Atheism' in Early Modern 
England" in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th Series 35 p. 137. 
82. Veall p. 18. 
83. ibid p. 18. Love had the benefit of counsel, principally Matthew Hale, to argue the legal niceties 
of whether the offence of Treason had been made out as a matter of law. James Fitzjames 
Stephen, described by Brailsford as "far from being a humanitarian" believed the result of the 
way in which the accused had to conduct his defence was "an amount of injustice frightful to 
think of." History of Criminal Law in England Vol I, p. 389 - 402 in Brailsford, The Levellers 
and the English Revolution p. 539. 
84. Indeed, the Attorney-General made Love's continuous references the subject of adverse 
comment. "I did expect from this gentleman, that he would not have continued those fearful 
imprecations of calling God to witness;" (p. 168) an oblique insinuation that Love was lying. 
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trial "Sir, you are no Witness; if you be a Witness, come and swear." (85) 
The Attorney-General in his reply to Love's defence identified this paradox "I wish 
there were not cause ... to think otherwise: but surely [Love] hath made large 
imprecations, and hath spoken much for himself; but I believe he knows there is so 
much justice here, that he expects not to be believed in what he says. (86) If it were 
enough to accuse, who should be innocent? And if it were enough to deny, who 
should be guilty? He doth not expect to be believed for his word certainly." (87) The 
Attorney-General reminded the court that Love had made "deep Protestations". Whilst 
the Attorney-General "did hope that they were not made with any relation to 
equivocation, or mental reservation, but [were] a positive denial of any facts of treason 
... having looked upon them... [the Attorney-General found] that they [were] somewhat 
cautious, and perchance they may be true... in the sense spoken of by Mr Love; but 
whether true in the sense they should have been spoken by a Christian in a public 
assembly, that I shall not judge." (88) 
In this context, though, it seems that the Attorney-General was referring not so much 
to whether Love may have been lying or seeking to mislead, but rather to his earlier 
submission that the "Christian way" was to confess as the first step to repentance 
(89) rather than to wait until the evidence given was so clearly adverse that an 
acknowledgement of its truth was rendered virtually inevitable. Love's response to this 
was that "I deemed it against nature for any to confess against himself, unless he 
could be sure his confession should not prejudice him. And I might have been guilty 
of my own blood, if I had confessed; for then, did the matter confessed amount to 
Treason by your law, my life would be at your mercy, and you might hang me upon 
mine own confession". (90) 
85. p. 60. 
86. This cannot have been deliberate irony. 
87. p. 169. 
88 	p. 196. 
89. 	p. 168. 
90 	p. 159. Love seems to be referring to the legal absurdity that suicide was a capital offence. 
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Even then, the Attorney-General alleged that "these asseverations were studied to 
evade ... he would speak true, but not the whole truth." (91) Whilst it "begs the 
question" there is no indication whether Love's credibility would have been immune 
from such attack had his evidence been sworn, thus constituting actual (and 
contradictory) evidence rather than mere denial. One suspects not, given the rationale 
for not allowing an accused person to call witnesses, "if the prisoner's witnesses gave 
evidence which conflicted with that given on behalf of the prosecution, such a 
procedure would open the door to perjury." (92) It is ironic that the procedure should 
be endorsed as preventing perjury, not condemned as a bar to either establishing the 
innocence of the accused, or his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (93) 
Notwithstanding Love's defence upon the facts, Hale's submissions on the law, and 
Love's vehement protestations of innocence, he was found guilty and condemned to 
death. His Presbyterianism had always been acknowledged, but it is in his defence, 
and particularly in his speech from the scaffold, that the basis of his view about oaths 
is openly stated. Fundamentally, it lay in the religio/political "old covenanting principles, 
from which, through the grace of God, I will never depart for any terror or persuasion 
whatsoever." (94) 
In his defence, Love revealed that he had "all along engaged [his] estate and life in 
the parliament's quarrel against the forces raised by the king:... not from any aim at 
profit, but out of a persuasion of conscience and sense of duty... Many gave [to 
parliament] out of their abundance; but [he] out of [his] want." (95) Clearly he had 
91 	p. 197. 
92. Veall p. 19. 
93. See too Munninos v Barrett [1987-89] TR 88 @ 88 wherein the views of Cave J in Reo v  
Shimmin [1882] 15 COX CC 122 @ 124 were cited with approval "... his statement was not 
made on oath, and ... he was not liable to be cross- examined by the prosecuting counsel, and 
what he said was therefore not entitled to the same weight as sworn testimony." I am grateful 
to Mr. P. Evans for this reference. 
94. p. 160. 
95 	pp. 160-1. 
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preached "for the lawfulness of a defensive war"; (96) he deemed it his duty to do so. 
Indeed, Marchamont Nedham argued Love "had forfeited his title to godly minister 
when he preached rebellion in the second civil war". (97) The condemnation is ironical 
from a man described by Sampson as a "political turncoat," a man for whom, 
presumably, obligations under oath must have been at best ambulatory. 
Whilst Love refrained from confessing complicity in the alleged Treason, he "thus far 
own[ed] the thing, that it was agreeable to [his] judgment and conscience. For [he] 
thought the interest of God and religion, and the good of the nation, would be more 
advanced if the king went into Scotland upon Covenant terms..." (98) Love says 
nothing as to his reasons or justification for the initial breach of allegiance to 
Charles I. 
Love petitioned Parliament for a stay of execution, and petitioned Cromwell for 
remittance of the death penalty. Cromwell apparently acceded to this request, but the 
notification of same was delayed (by royalists) from reaching London until after the 
execution had taken place. (99) It is in Love's speech upon the scaffold, therefore, that 
one looks for truth - one would expect him to speak the truth unreservedly; he had 
nothing to lose, and was soon to meet his God, a God obviously accepted as Judge. 
(100) There can be no doubt, but that Love expected to answer to that judgmental 
God. "God is my record, whom I serve in the spirit; I speak the truth, and lye not... I 
hope you will believe a dying man, who dares not look God in the face with a lye in 
his mouth." (101) 
96. p. 161. 
97. See M. Sampson, "Laxity and Liberty in Seventeenth-Century English Political Thought" 
in E. Leites, (ed.), Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe p. 113. 
98. p. 164. 
99. See commentary at commencement of transcript pp. 43-4. 
100. If God is not a judgmental God, the divine sanction is meaningless. 
101. pp. 253 and 255. 
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In the same way as one would expect Love to speak the truth in his rather extreme 
circumstances, one would also expect him to address the issues which meant most 
to him - his preoccupation on the scaffold was with the political reality of the 
Engagement Controversy. Notwithstanding the Attorney-General's earlier efforts to 
avoid any likelihood that the trial be seen as a "show trial" brought for political ends, 
Love was quite blunt as to why he thought he was to die. "Upon a civil account my life 
is pretended to be taken away, whereas indeed it is because I pursue my Covenant, 
and will not prostitute my principles and conscience to the ambition and lusts of men". 
(102) 
Love, representative of the Presbyterian mind set, would not break the oath he had 
taken in the Solemn League and Covenant; he would not recant for the sake of 
political expediency. Brailsford says of the Solemn League and Covenant that "the 
Presbyterian clergy.., took it, voluntarily and very often with enthusiasm"; (103) an 
enthusiasm not shared, or at least not maintained by those in power in Parliament. 
Again though, it was not that Parliament expressed a belief that the oath could be 
broken casually or without explanation. Rather, the casuistry entailed for Cromwell that 
it was "an act of duty to break an unrighteous engagement; he that keeps it does a 
double sin, in that he makes an unrighteous engagement and in that he goes about 
to keep it." (104) Ireton believed an engagement (in the instant case that between 
Army and Parliament) "may, nay must be broken, if its observance involves "sin", that 
is to say disobedience to God". (105) 
It is not so much that Love and his fellow Presbyterians denied that duty may dictate 
that an engagement be broken: "all agree there are cases in which it is lawful to 
102. p. 253 and see p. 257. "Now this is only a political engine to make the Presbyterian party 
odious, who are the best friends to a well-ordered government, of any sort of people in the 
world." 
103. Brailsford The Levellers and the English Revolution p. 260. 
104. ibid p. 273. 
105. ibid p. 280. 
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resist" (106). Rather, as Hobbes recognised, the difficulty lay in identifying the case 
in which morality and right conduct demanded such breach of covenant or resistance. 
"The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that men when they are commanded in the 
name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether the command be from God, or 
whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some private ends of his 
own." (107) For Love, adherence to the oath of the Solemn League and Covenant was 
a non-negotiable and continuing obligation. 
Interestingly, Lilburne had, according to Brailsford "surprised everyone by taking [the 
Engagement], but promptly added the reservation that by the Commonwealth to which 
he promised fidelity, he meant "all the good and legal people of England" and not "the 
present Parliament, Council of State, or Council of the Army". (108) There is a rather 
attractive irony in a Leveller adopting a mechanism usually regarded as the province 
of the Jesuits. 
Love insinuated that the matter had been prejudged - the Bench were bound to find 
him guilty, regardless of the evidence. "As concerning my judges, I will not judge them, 
and yet I will not justify them: I will say but this of them, I believe that what moved 
Herod to cut off John Baptist's head, that moved them to cut off mine; and that was 
for his oaths sake: (emphasis mine) Herod, to avoid perjury, would commit murder; 
(109) whereas if John's head had been upon his shoulders, he would have been 
guilty of neither" (110). 
106. ibid p. 363. 
107. Hobbes, Leviathan p. 609. 
108. op cit p. 608. Alymer calls it a "tongue-in-cheek subscription" in "England's Spirit Unfoulded, 
or an Incouragement to Take the Engagement. A Newly Discovered Pamphlet by Gerard 
INinstanley" in Past and Present 40 (1968) p. 6. 
109. It is interesting that Love uses the word "perjury" in this context. 
110. p. 254. See too Wiles C.B. in Omichund v Barker supra p. 545, and "A Sermon Against 
Swearing and Perjury" infra - "Herod as hee, tooke a wicked oath, so hee more wickedly 
performed the same, and cruelly slewe the most holy Prophet." p. 49. 
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That the political context of the Engagement was in truth operating upon the court may 
be seen from the treatment of two Counsel called on behalf of Love. Mr Archer and 
Mr Waller appeared for him; they had been assigned by the Court. The Attorney-
General "demanded of them whether or no they had subscribed the Engagement? 
they answered, they had not done it... The Court [demanded] whether or no they 
would subscribe the Engagement? They answered, That they desired time to consider 
of it; and so withdrew." (111) Those Counsel were not heard on Love's behalf; 
apparently they did not swear and were thus excluded from appearing. The interesting 
question is the Court's state of knowledge. 
The actual confrontation therefore, lay in Love's adherence to the Solemn League and 
Covenant, and his refusal to subscribe the Engagement. (112) "I was never for putting 
the king to death, whose person I did promise in my covenant to preserve:...I did in 
my place and calling oppose his forces, but I did never endeavour to destroy his 
person... I deemed it an ill way to cure the body-politick, by cutting off the political 
head. ..l die with my judgment absolutely set against the Engagement; I pray God 
forgive them that impose and subscribe it, and preserve those that refuse it". (113) 
Love believed he died a martyr. He claimed that he remained faithful to the oath of the 
Solemn League and Covenant; he had no doubt but that he died for it. 
111. pp. 210-211. 
112. Maybe it was also that he had actively opposed (preached against) it. 
113. p. 258 and see further p. 259. "I die cleaving to all those oaths, vows, covenants, and 
protestations that were imposed by the two houses of parliament, as owning them, and dying 
with my judgment for them; to the protestation, the vow and covenant, the solemn league and 
covenant. And this I tell you all, I had rather die a covenant-keeper, than live a covenant-
breaker". 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Quaker Response 
The religious intensity of the age, and perhaps the religious confusion, are evidenced 
by the transcript of the Love Trial. The assertion that . a Presbyterian Minister was 
employing Jesuit devices to avoid obligation under oath is ironic to say the least. The 
same irony goes deeper; Quakers, "one of the most enthusiastic and radical fringe 
groups" (1) were, by their absolute refusal to swear, "exposed to the charge that they 
were Catholics in disguise." (2) Christopher Love and the Quakers had something else 
in common - they both suffered for the misidentification, and for their respective 
refusals to swear; whether limited to the Engagement, or absolutely. 
It may be recognised that the trial and execution of Love had their genesis in politics. 
The persecution of Quakers too was politically motivated. Quite apart from the 
perennial quest for religious uniformity as a bulwark of loyalty to the State, the 
particular form of Quaker religious dissent was equated with anarchy. (3) Indeed, 
Brailsford in his deceptively quaint comment that "we should learn a good deal of the 
truth about class [in the seventeenth-century] if we could grasp the whole etiquette of 
hats" (4), advances the view that the Quaker refusal to comply with social norms and 
etiquettes about hats "like most of the Quaker beliefs and practices, from the 
Anabaptist tradition.., was an affirmation of human equality, a revolt against class." (5) 
1. C. W. Hone, The Quakers and the English Legal System 1660 - 1688 (1988) p. xii. 
2. ibid p. 11. 
3. "The Quakers became a State within a State" ibid p. 15. 
4. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution p. 45. 
5. ibid. See too Hone op cit p. 14. "[Quaker] refusal to doff hats in the court could be construed 
as contempt of court and of magistracy". 
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Whilst the executive displayed a similar (persecuting) response to the Quakers and 
to those Presbyterians who would not subscribe the Engagement, the motivations for 
the dissenters were fundamentally different. For the Quakers it was not primarily a 
question of politics, but of religion; of observing the injunctions Christ gave in the 
Gospels; "they would never take an oath, for... they would not surrender their 
consciences to another's keeping." (6) It may be too that rejecting oath-taking was 
entailed by the Quaker rejection of sacraments. (7) 
The Quakers based their refusal to take oaths primarily upon Matthew 5:33-37: "Again, 
ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear 
thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you, Swear not at 
all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: 
neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou swear by 
thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your 
communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of 
evil." (8) Watts explains "the frequent Puritan accusation that... Quakers... were 
papists in disguise" by reference to the Quaker "reject[ion of] both Calvinism and the 
supremacy of Scripture." (9) If that explanation is correct, the literal interpretation of 
Matthew's Gospel seems somewhat anomalous. 
Not all believed that Matthew's report of Christ's words constituted a complete 
prohibition against swearing. Even as Shakespeare's works reflect a lay consideration 
of the paradox inherent in oath-taking, so the religious question of whether or not it 
was open for a Christian to swear had been the subject of debate under Elizabeth, as 
6. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution p. 31. See too Watts, "The Quaker 
refusal to render to Caesar the things that are God's is of the very essence of Dissent". The 
Dissenters; From the Reformation to the French Revolution p. 3. 
7. "An oath was still almost a sacrament" Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 497. 
8. Matthew 5: 33-37. 
9. Watts, The Dissenters p. 208. 
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may be seen in "A Sermon Against Swearing and Perjury" appearing in Certaine  
Sermons or Homilies 1547-1571. The religious allegiance of the writer is not disclosed, 
although the fact that the sermon was preached is evidence that there was current 
debate as to whether or not it was lawful to swear; it was obviously the subject of 
concern for those wishing to live a godly life. 
The writer, perhaps belying the title, concluded that some swearing was lawful, indeed 
mandatory for a true Christian. Perhaps not surprisingly, his conclusion was that "when 
Judges require othes of the people for declaration or opening of the trueth, or for 
execution of justice... also when men make faithfull promises with calling to witnesse 
of the Name of God to keepe covenants... when Subjects doe swear to be true and 
faithfull to their King and Soveraigne Lord... all these maner of swearing, for causes 
necessary and honest, be lawfull". (10) 
The writer went further, to argue that "lawful' swearing is not forbidden, but 
commanded by Almighty God", the assertion cited in support being that "Christ, and 
godly men, in holy Scripture.., did sweare themselves, and required othes of others 
likewise". (11) Provided therefore that an oath was taken for one of the legitimate 
purposes cited above, and "[done]... with judgement, not rashly and unadvisedly, but 
soberly, considering what an oath is [it] is a part of Gods glory, which we are bound 
by his commandements to give unto him. For hee willeth that wee shall sweare onely 
by his name". (12) 
It may be seen that notwithstanding the numerous Biblical references, predominantly 
Old Testament, cited in support of the writer's position, there was also a secular and 
utilitarian basis for his view. "By lawfull oathes... common lawes are kept inviolate, 
10. "A Sermon Against Swearing and Perjury" from Certaine Sermons or Homilies 1547 - 1571  
(1623 Edition) pp. 45-6. 
11. ibid p. 46. 
12. ibid p. 47. 
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Justice is indifferently ministered, harmlesse persons, fatherlesse children, widowes, 
and poore men, are defended from murderers, oppressers and theeves, that they 
suffer no wrong, nor take any harme... by lawfull oathes, malefactors are searched out, 
wrong doers are punished, and they which sustaine wrong, are restored to their right." 
(13) 
The debate intensified with the Quakers, whose essential position may be discerned 
from a work published in 1656. (14) It was written by a Quaker "a Sufferer for Christ 
and his Doctrine", and bears the initials F.H. (15) It is a rambling and repetitive 
document, and the arguments are not significantly different from the issues raised 
(more succinctly) in the Elizabethan Sermon referred to above. (16). 
The allegations made by Smallwood, and thus the Quaker response, fluctuated 
between the religious and the secular. The work concentrates upon the text in 
Matthew; the argument which Smallwood had advanced was clearly that that text 
could not be read in isolation, nor as an "absolute universal prohibition of all manner 
of swearing under the Gospel". (17) The primary allegation was, perhaps not 
13. ibid p. 47. 
14. The work is exhaustively entitled "Oaths no Gospel Ordinance But Prohibited by Christ Being 
in Answer to A. Smallwood, D.D. To his Book lately published, being a Sermon Preached at 
Carlisle, 1664 wherein he hath laboured to prove, Swearing lawful among Christians; his 
Reasons and Arguments are weighed and answered, and the Doctrine of Christ Vindicated 
against the Conceptions and Interpretations of Men, who would make it void". I do not 
understand the dating - clearly a book published in 1656 could not be in answer to a Sermon 
preached and "book lately published" in 1664. 
15. References to this document will subsequently be cited as FH. 
16. Indeed, the arguments are also the same in later documents eg, "A Reply to so much of a 
Sermon Published in the Course of Last Year, by Philip Dodd, As Relates to the Well Known 
Scruple of the Society of Friends Commonly Called Quakers, Against All Swearing" by Joseph 
Gurney Bevan 1808 and "Oaths; Their Moral Character, And Effects" by Jonathan Dymond - 
undated, but citing Paley so at the earliest a late eighteenth-century document. 
17. FH p. 1. I have been unable to obtain Smallwood's sermon/book; in any event, his arguments 
are set out in FH's reply; "laid down as AS hath published them, without varying from his own 
words". 
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unexpectedly, that "we who deny to swear, would abolish all judicable proceedings, 
and make them nothing," (18), and that the Quakers' interpretation of Matthew's text 
"tends to overthrow all Judicatures... and we should be necessitated if not to disown 
the Magistrates authority, yet to disobey their loyal command, as having a 
countermand from Christ". (19) F.H's answer is that "Witnesses, and all emergent suits 
and controversies ended according to the best evidence after diligent inquisition... 
without the needless and cumbersome formality of an Oath, which is sometime this, 
and sometime that... That which answers the cause in hand is not denyed, true 
testimony". (20) 
Horle cites Edward Burrough who puts the same point: "A man that truly and uprightly 
fears God will be as much afraid and make as much conscience of speaking falsely, 
as of swearing falsely, and out of a good conscience will testify as truly, as if he 
swore". As for anyone who fears to swear falsely but was not afraid to speak falsely 
without an oath, "this is because there is a greater punishment to such, and it is 
accounted a greater offence among men, to swear falsely than to speak falsely." (21) 
This shows the extent to which the Quaker's theory of obligation was at variance with 
"mainstream" religious, legal and political theory. It stands in direct contrast with the 
justification of the divine sanction theory of oaths as put by the Lord President in the 
Love Trial. "No man can tell here whose conscience is crazy and tender: conscience 
is a thing betwixt God and man only; and they that lay nothing upon their consciences  
to prove their integrity," (emphasis mine), they had as good say nothing before a 
judge...there are so many consciences as there are men; and no men have power to 
18. FH p. 2. 
19. FH p. 3. 
20. FH p. 4. 
21. Hone,  The Quakers and the English Legal System 1660- 1688  p. 169. 
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judge of it; but God." (22) 
The other principal attack by Smallwood upon the Quaker interpretation was textually 
based upon Biblical grounds. First, that God, in the Old Testament, had commanded 
swearing: "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God... and shalt swear by his name", (23) thus 
Christ could not have commanded the contrary. FH dismisses this - Christ came to 
perfect the Law that God had given to the Jews - in the event of inconsistency, the 
New Testament overrides the Old; "The Gospel exceeds the Law in every point". (24) 
There is further technical debate as to whether the words "swear not at all" are then 
qualified by the following examples - whether the examples are illustrations of the 
general prohibition, or whether the only form of swearing which is in fact prohibited is 
that done by reference to that (limited) list. Perhaps more meaningfully, Smallwood 
asserted that Christ only forbad that which was intrinsically evil, whereas "Swearing 
was not evil in [itself] but because forbidden" (25). The Quaker response was a flat 
denial of the proposition: "we... affirme all swearing to be now a sin, because 
forbidden by the positive law of Christ under the Gospel". (26). 
FH, acknowledging the severe penalties to which Quakers were liable, argued that the 
subject should be treated as a matter of substance, and not of form. "If the Law had 
been answered in the substance [the magistrate should] not.., be so severe in the 
forme... the Consciences of believers could not yield obedience thereunto, when it was 
22. The Trial of Mr Christopher Love State Trials 188 @ p. 247. 
23. Deut 6:13. 
24. FH p. 65. 
25. FH p. 21. 
26. FH p. 22. 
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repugnant under the Law of God". (27) His plea recalls, albeit with irony, the self-
righteous assertions made by the Lord President in the Love trial, that there was total 
synonymity between the Laws of England and the Laws of God. 
FH sought to argue that at one level, the dispute distilled into one purely of definition 
- what constitutes an oath? He asserted that "the substance of the Law was not 
denyed, though we except against the formality which is now used... those things 
which AS and others calls swearing, we have condescended unto; yet it's reckoned 
as insufficient, though themselves say it is an oath, yet it is not called so, nor 
accounted so, except the aforesaid needless trifles be observed. (28)... is not this a 
hard thing, and far from equity, justice and reason?" (29) The yea and nay, therefore, 
can be subscribed in a testimonial way; it is rather the attendant ceremonies which 
breach Christ's ordinance (30) . Using the same definitional argument, the examples 
cited by Smallwood when Christ or his disciples were alleged to have sworn, were 
dismissed by FH as examples of emphasis: "ardent and zealous, or fervent 
expressions, as the Spirit of God.., did stir up in his heart." (31) 
There is no doubt that FH was strongly committed to the Scriptural basis which 
underpinned the Quakers' determination not to swear. He was, though, a part of the 
wider community which recognised the basic dilemma - swearing did not seem to 
27. FH p. 11. The point is reiterated by Dymond "Of him... who is assured of the prohibition, it is 
indispensably required that he should refuse an oath. There is no other means of maintaining 
our allegiance to God. Our pretensions to Christianity are at stake: for he who, knowing the 
Christian law, will not conform to it, is certainly not a Christian." from "Oaths, Their Moral 
Character, And Effects" p. 12. 
28. The "needless trifles" are" a man holding up his hand, or laying it upon a Bible, and kissing it, 
and saying after a Clark or a Cryer, I swear". FH p. 28. 
29. FH p. 28. 
30. Watts agrees that many were "converted" to Quakerism because of "controversies about 
ceremonies", particularly among different Baptist communities. "To many... Baptists, bowed 
down by the legal requirements of their new religion, the Quaker exaltation of the Spirit over 
the letter came as a heaven-sent release." The Dissenters pp. 206-7. 
31. FH p. 32. FH is referring here to words such as "Verily, verily", "Amen" etc. 
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operate as a matter of fact as a guarantee of truth or obligation. FH pointed out that 
"we see by experience notwithstanding all the reverent taking, and all the solemn 
taking, and the necessity that is put upon Oaths, yet they have never answered the 
end purposed... indeed.., frequent swearing hath made men being got into a custome 
of it that it is become a light thing unto them... indeed... Oaths are becom'd of little or 
no force at all." (32) His empirical evidence for this proposition comprised mainly the 
numerous examples of breaches of oaths of allegiance. The later tract "Oaths; Their 
Moral Character and Effects" does not so confine the argument. Rather, Dymond 
asserted bluntly that "oaths.., tend... powerfully to deprave the moral character... they 
are continually violated.., men are continually referring to the most tremendous 
sanctions of religion with the habitual belief that those sanctions impose no practical 
obligation.., you must speak the truth when you are upon your oath; which is the 
same thing as to say that it is less harm to violate truth when you are not on your 
oath." (33) 
The Quakers had a subsidiary concern; that swearing for what the Elizabethan writer 
and Smallwood would identify as legitimate purposes, was really "the thin end of the 
wedge" (34), and that it had the capacity to lead to vain swearing, blasphemy, and a 
breach of God's third commandment; "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy 
God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain". (35) 
"Oh what sad times do we behold, nothing but extreames of evil are presented to our 
eyes and eares, some do little but swear ordinarily, commonly and vainly.., almost 
everywhere are full of dreadful Oathes and Mens discourses interwoven with execrable 
and direful Oaths, even as it were daring God to confound them and damn them". (36) 
32. FH pp. 16-17. 
33. J. Dymond, "Oaths, their Moral Character And Effects" p. 11. 
34. "We never swear", says the Quaker, "not even in a Court of justice, being of opinion that the 
most holy name of God ought not to be prostituted in the miserable contests betwixt man and 
man". Montagu, The Anatomy of Swearing p. 222. 
35. Exodus 20:7. 
36. FH pp. 79-80. 
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The Quakers were neither the first to express this concern, nor alone; it has a history 
through the Middle Ages. (37) Montagu identifies a pamphlet in 1540 wherein a 
Stephen Hawes "Depicts the sufferings that, as he believed, were daily being inflicted 
upon the body of Christ. In gory detail he describes how the hands and feet of Christ 
were being literally pierced anew and every member and portion of his body torn and 
lacerated by the imprecations of unheeding Christians". (38) 
That the Quakers were sincere in their belief cannot be doubted. As FH recognised, 
"myself and many more are great sufferers" (39) because they would not/could not 
swear. Horle identifies the significant consequences for the Quakers arising from their 
refusal to swear; they were wide ranging and penal. "Normal legal practice prevented 
those who refused to swear from sitting on juries, recovering stolen goods, suing for 
debts, carrying on trades in corporate towns, probating wills involving goods and 
chattels, giving evidence to defend titles, entering into copyholds, answering suit either 
in equity or church courts, or holding any law enforcement position which required an 
oath of office... refusal [of the Oath of Allegiance] also resulted in indictment and trial, 
with guilt punishable by praemunire, which placed the offender outside the king's 
protection and involved forfeiture of goods and chattels, loss of all income from real 
property and imprisonment for life or at the king's pleasure." (40) Notwithstanding the 
severity of the penalties and disabilities, the Quakers believed their interpretation of 
Matthew was "truly and conscientiously grounded upon the Doctrine of Christ, and 
consonant to the Primitive Christians". (41) 
In order to remain true to their religious imperatives, the Quakers defied the legal 
system, but like Love, they did not meekly submit to it, but rather sought to use it for 
37. See Montagu, The Anatomy of Swearing p. 11711. 
38. ibid p. 128. 
39. FH p. 1. 
40. Hone, The Quakers and the English Legal System 1660-1688  p. 49. 
41. FH p. 1. 
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their own protection. (42) They forced the issue to be confronted; were oaths really a 
guarantee of truth and obligation such that they should be exacted as a threshhold to 
admissible testimony? 
For Love the obligations entailed by subscription of the Solemn League and Covenant 
were absolute; for the Quakers, telling the truth was the absolute obligation. Oaths 
were prohibited to Quakers, and in any event, in their view, did not necessarily operate 
as a guarantee of truthfulness. "So do we make void the law, or the perfection of it, 
by speaking the truth, and bearing witness to the truth; though... we cannot own those 
typical ceremonious way of swearing.., he that speaks the truth and bears witness in 
and from the truth, honours Gods name, and reverences it, forasmuch as he is called 
the God of truth... being lawfully called before a Magistrate to bear testimony in any 
thing wherein the glory of God, or our Neighbour is concerned, or the decision of 
Controversy.., true testimony is a medium that concernes as much to that purpose 
now as swearing [once] did". (43) 
42. "Friends [were forced] to rely on technical arguments that only a lawyer could love." 
Horle, op cit p. 210. 
43. FH p. 36. 
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Conclusion 
"An oath, an oath! I have an oath in heaven; 
Shall I lay perjury upon my soul?" (1) 
Shakespeare in his Merchant of Venice, probably written in 1596, links oaths with 
their "mirror image" of perjury. Shylock's resistance to Portia's plea for mercy and his 
reliance upon the letter of the law and his bond resulted in his humiliation, the 
forfeiture of his goods, and the pardon of his life conditional upon him becoming a 
Christian. Whilst mercy may be "an attribute to God himself" (2) it is an irony that 
Shylock's refusal to perjure himself, (3) to jeopardise his soul and to defy the divine 
sanction should be the cause of his grief. Love would certainly have been surprised. 
"I have finished my course, I have fought the good fight, I have kept the faith, 
henceforth there is a crown of righteousness laid up for me; and not for me only, but 
for all them that love.. .our Lord Jesus Christ" (4) 
The Quakers based their absolute refusal to swear in part upon Scripture, believing 
that to swear constituted a breach of Christ's ordinance as set out in the Gospel, and 
a breach of the third commandment. In contrast, Hobbes when considering "the 
actions of Divine Worship [held it] a most general! Precept of Reason, that they be 
signes of the Intention to Honour God... Not to swear by any but God [was] naturally 
a signe of Honour: for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that 
1. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice Act IV Scene 1. 
2. ibid. 
3. Hobbes believed that "Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being 
Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and Forgivenesse, the restitution 
of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted." Leviathan 
p. 198. 
4. The Trial of Mr Christopher Love  supra p. 264. 
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no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengence on the perjured." 
(5) A consideration of seventeenth-century English attitudes to oath-taking and the 
obligations thereby created is necessarily amplified by a consideration of attitudes to 
perjury. 
The belief that God has the power to punish or reward in this world and the next is 
axiomatic to the theory of oath-taking. The writer of the Elizabethan "Sermon Against 
Swearing and Perjury" wished his audience to know "how great and grievous an 
offence against God.. .[is] wilfull perjurie...whosoever wilfully forsweare themselves 
upon Christs holy Evangelie, they utterly forsake Gods mercy, goodnesse, and trueth, 
the merits of our Saviour Christs nativity, life, passion, death, resurrection and 
ascension, they refuse the forgivenesse of sinnes, promised to all penitent sinners, the 
joyes of heaven, the company with Angels and Saints for ever.. .[and] doe betake 
themselves to the DiveIs service.., provoking the great indignation and curse of God 
against them in this life, and the terrible wrath and judgement of our Saviour Christ... 
whosoever forsaketh the trueth, doeth forsake Christ, and with Judas betray him." (6) 
Once again, it is evident that the sermon was given in response to a perceived evil. 
The case of Anne Nightingale of St. Martin in 1635 is evidence of contemporary 
acceptance of the reality of God's punishment for perjury. "Her master, having got her 
with child, had offered her ten pounds to nominate her fellow-servant as the father. 
She succumbed to the temptation, but afterwards repented: "she confesseth to have 
done him great wrong and doth desire God's great mercy to forgive her.., and she 
likewise confesseth that God is a just and a righteous God unto her and that he hath 
justly punished her for her foul and false accusation by taking from her the use of her 
limbs." (7) The attribution of her disability to God's justice (or wrath) is of the same 
5. op cit pp. 403-404. 
6. "A Sermon Against Swearing and Perjury" from Certaine Sermons or Homilies 1547 - 1571  
p. 50. 
7. 	Ingram, Church Courts p. 330. 
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ilk as explaining national disasters in terms of God's punishment upon a sinful people. 
(8) That the church promoted the divine sanction is a self-evident proposition - perjury 
was a cardinal sin. (9) 
Notwithstanding a general acceptance of the reality and immediacy of God's 
punishment, though, the secular ramifications of the performance of obligations under 
oath were significant; the State's attitudes to oathtaking seem rather ironically to have 
been influenced by an endeavour to avoid perjury, rather than by punishment of it. 
This curiosity has been noted as a reason why accused persons could not call their 
own witnesses; inconsistent with a pursuit of justice. Hill explains that examination on 
oath in tithe suits was abolished because it led to "widespread perjury among 
dishonest traders... All took it for granted that men would forswear themselves rather 
than give up what they thought necessary economic and social activities; what was 
resented was the action of the church courts in forcing (emphasis mine) them to 
commit perjury in the attempt to maintain obsolete standards of conduct." (10) 
The same rationale appears to have been operative in attitudes to the ex officio oath. 
Indeed, Article 27 of the Root and Branch Petition 1640 complained of "the imposing 
of oaths of various and trivial articles yearly upon churchwardens... which they cannot 
take without perjury, (emphasis mine) unless they fall at jars continually with their 
ministers and neighbours." (11) Clearly, the impact of community was more significant 
than the divine sanction, but the concept of being forced to breach obligations under 
oath, and of being forced by law to regard those obligations as at best ambulatory, is 
an incredible abnegation of (criminal) responsibility. 
8. B. Lenman, "The Limits of Godly Discipline in the Early Modern Period with Particular 
Reference to England and Scotland" in von Greyerz (ed.), Religion and Society in Early  
Modern Europe 1500 - 1800 p. 128. 
9. See Maguire, "Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio As Administered in the 
Ecclesiastical Courts in England" in Essays in History and Political Theory in Honour of C.H.  
Mc Ilwain p. 215. 
10. Hill, Society and Puritanism pp. 400-401. See too p. 393. Hill there cites a Petition from Kent 
in 1640 that "Bishops "impose oaths upon churchwardens, to the most apparent danger of filling 
the land with perjury." 
11. "The Root and Branch Petition" from Gardiner, Constitutional Documents p. 72. 
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Ingram notes that the "selectivity of presentments [before the Church Courts] 
scandalised some contemporary observers, who viewed it as a symptom of mass 
perjury." (12) He argues that the churchwardens exercised a "laudable discretion... 
[in which they] showed a robust regard for the distinctions between the serious and 
the trivial." (13) He notes further and significantly that "judges... made very sparing 
use of the [ex-officio] oath, tendering it.. .only when there was some particular reason 
to do so. Apparently this did not undermine efficiency, and it probably represented the  
wisest policy in the circumstances."  (emphasis mine) (14) Again, there is apparent a 
policy of "prevention is better than cure". Further, there was "a slight but increasing 
tendency for defendants to refuse flatly to be sworn." (15) If not sworn, the issue of 
perjury as legally defined does not arise. 
It was always open to the accused to "deny the articles and make the prosecution 
prove its case, in fact a plea of "not guilty". Even when the evidence was 
overwhelmingly against the accused he was never.. .prosecuted for having denied 
something on oath which was patently true." (16) That remains the situation in 
secular courts today, yet there is no basis in logic for the exception; there is a 
qualitative difference between the legitimate course of claiming the privilege against 
self-incrimination and putting the prosecution to proof, and actually tendering false 
evidence under oath. 
12. Ingram, Church Courts p. 325. 
13. ibid p. 328. It has been suggested that "selective enforcement was a valuable tool of class 
power... [and] that a discretionary legal system offered [advantages] to those in control and... 
that the ability to grant mercy or to deny it was an essential expression of the power of 
paternalism." 
C. B. Herrup, "Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century England" 
Past and Present 106 (1985) p. 103. 
14. op cit p. 330. 
15. ibid. 
16. R. A. Marchant, The Puritans and the Church Courts in the Diocese of York 1560 - 1642 
p.191. 
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The seventeenth-century response to perjured informers discloses a curious attitude 
to oath-taking; oaths and obligations thereunder were apparently not of pre-eminent 
concern to the executive, but rather secondary to the issues of stability and social 
control. It certainly reflects a selective reading of Scripture, and a convenient lapse of 
memory of the commandment "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy 
neighbour", (17) quite apart from satisfying even the most fundamental requisites of 
justice. 
Hone cites the case of Francis Plumstead, a London Quaker, who appealed against 
fines imposed upon him after being convicted for having attended two meetings and 
preached at one. For the purposes of the appeal, he "secured an affidavit from the 
informers that they had sworn falsely and produced two witnesses who testified he 
hadn't preached." The judge though "rather than grant the appeal, persuaded the jury 
to find Plumstead guilty of having been at one meeting." (18) Whilst there is 
something incongruous about securing an affidavit (evidence on oath) from a person 
to the effect that his previous evidence on oath had been perjured, the response of 
the State is illustrative. The judge involved was Sir Thomas Jenner, who was "either 
aiding and abetting informers in appeal trials, or refusing to censor their lying." (19) 
It seems that the impetus to punish the perjury of informers came not from the State 
but from the Quakers who were the victims. (20) The institution of appeals delayed 
proceedings, and thus the payment of the financial reward to the informer, and 
17. Exodus 20:16. As Thomas points out though, "the application of the Ten Commandments to 
daily life had never been a straightforward business; it did not grow easier with the passage of 
time and the emergence of conditions very different from those of ancient Israel." 
Thomas, "Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England" p. 30. 
18. Hone, The Quakers and the English Legal System 1660 - 1688 p. 138. 
19. ibid p. 202. 
20. Ultimately the State is also adversely affected if the law falls into disrepute, and confidence in 
it is lost. 
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afforded the Quakers the opportunity to produce their own witnesses. (21) That the 
Quakers were able to produce witnesses on appeal is surprising, however it seems 
that the evidence was discounted "for though no proof will be allowed in the negative 
of the informers' testimony in the affirmative, yet if the appellant's evidence be able 
to prove that the party convicted was not at the time of the supposed conventicle at 
the place mentioned in the conviction, but at another place far distant from it, such 
proofs are such negative evidence as in themselves do carry an affirmative. And in 
case such witnesses should exceed in number the informers' witnesses, all courts of 
justice ought to (emphasis mine) allow of such witnesses on the appellant's behalf, as 
affirmative evidence to destroy the first conviction of the informers." (22) This 
summary of the status of witness' evidence is clearly only a submission that the law 
should be changed. 
It seems incredible that the State could have taken such an indulgent attitude to 
perjury, however "the system... depended to an inordinate degree on informers. Far 
more than mere informants, they were an integral feature of law enforcement, acting 
as witnesses, prosecutors, and motivators of reluctant officers." (23) One can only 
agree that the State's attitude to the perjury of informers was inexcusable, (24) and 
agree further with Dymond's argument that the conclusion to be drawn was "that the 
law thinks light of the crime which it does not punish." (25) It seems odd indeed that 
perjury should go relevantly unpunished, whilst Quakers were persecuted for refusing 
to swear, without investigation as to whether or not their evidence was (or would be) 
true. 
21. See ibid p. 203. 
22. ibid p. 204. 
23. ibid p. 273. 
24. ibid. 
25. J. Dymond, "Oaths; Their Moral Character, And Effects". p. 11. 
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A divergence between Church and State may be discerned in the treatment of and 
attitudes to perjury. Love held the view that perjury could only be committed by an 
atheist; that it was a sin so gross as to be inconsistent with belief in God. Whilst the 
demarcation was still inchoate, the State's at best pragmatic response to perjury 
indicates that sin and crime were becoming recognised as disparate. Perjury provides 
a rather surprising example of this separation. 
The Statute of Frauds 1677 is cited as "an attempt by the legislature to deal, if only 
indirectly and in part, with what was known to be the chief social evil of the age - 
perjury." (26) (emphasis mine); it had become common for shopkeepers to swear 
falsely that a customer had verbally contracted to purchase goods, hence the 
imposition of a statutory requirement that such transactions be evidenced in writing. 
The irony here is a somewhat bitter one though, and a sad reflection upon the 
priorities in a "period of universal oath-taking... while a man who stole five shillings 
was likely to be hanged, if he obtained the same by perjured evidence resulting in the 
death of an innocent man he was punished only by a small fine and an appearance 
in the pillory". (27) It can be seen that the prime motivation for the legislature in 
punishing as a crime the sin of perjury was a secular one; perjury was undermining 
contract. 
There is a fundamental inconsistency between the significance attached in 
seventeenth-century England to oath-taking and obligations created thereunder, and 
the indifference if not active encouragement of perjury. A parallel may be seen with 
the apparent contemporary failure of excommunication as an enforcement mechanism. 
(28) "Recusants... were glad to be excommunicated, since they did not intend to 
26. The New Cambridge Modern History vol V p. 313. 
27. ibid. 
28. It should be noted, though that perjury could result in excommunication. See Hill, Society and 
Puritanism p. 355. 
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come to church anyway: it saved them from having to pay a fine." (29) Quakers, for 
example, were "not scare[d] by the threat of excommunication.., for the number of 
excommunicates was immense." (30) Ingram notes that the popularity of 
excommunication as a punishment "was bitterly attacked by contemporary critics of 
the Church courts, who urged that the sanction should be... a solemn penalty 
employed in only the most serious cases." (31) 
Perhaps the apparent absurdity is entailed in the nature of the offence; that it is a 
matter between the individual and God. Excommunication, like the enforcement of 
obligations under oath, "relied for its effect on its immediate social and legal 
implications rather than on supernatural terrors such as the possibility of punishment 
in the world to come," (32) and, as Hobbes identified, "had its effect onely upon 
those, that beleeved that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory, to reign over, and 
to judge both the quick, and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his 
Kingdom, to those whose Sins were Retained". Always though is that central paradox 
"for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such as they who so 
beleeved, and expected the coming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and 
needed no other opinion, but onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved." (33) 
29. ibid p. 371 quoting Bishop Overton of Coventry and Lichfield in Strype, Annals of the 
Reformation III Part ii p. 217. 
30. Hone, The Quakers and the English Legal System 1660 - 1688 p. 230. 
31. Ingram, Church Courts p. 341 see too Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 362. 
32. ibid p. 342. Again, an increase in divergence between Church and State is discernible. 
"Medieval courts operated in an atmosphere in which the right of the church to regulate all 
aspects of religious and moral behaviour was rarely questioned and in which purely spiritual 
sanctions of ... excommunication were still viewed with some dread". Even then though, the 
dread was "partly because the church was still able to ensure that those sanctions had social 
and economic repercussions." from R. O'Day, and F. Heal, Continuity and Change: Personnel 
and Administration of the Church in England 1500- 1642 (1976) p. 19. 
33. Hobbes, Leviathan pp. 537-8. 
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Aaron and Shylock were outside the mainstream of English social and religious life; 
the one a Moor, the other a Jew. Both were the subject of prejudice and 
discrimination; both were used by Shakespeare to express a view about oaths and 
obligation. That such concern was not the preserve of the marginal in seventeenth-
century English society though is clear. Love epitomises the dilemma caused by 
successive and conflicting oaths of allegiance; the Quakers who refused to swear on 
religious grounds were predominantly middle class. 
Irony provides one of the thematic unities of this paper. Another unity though is the 
reality of the struggle by ordinary people to grapple with issues of conscience, and to 
reach some conclusion, even in the face of persecution or death, as to what was the 
rightful action. Love, the Quakers and Hobbes personified those who were genuinely 
trying to assimilate the social and political realities with their conscience imperatives. 
(34) 
It was eventually acknowledged by the legislature that the essential element of 
evidence in court proceedings was that it be truthful; after 1696 the Quakers were not 
obliged to give such evidence under oath, although many Quakers refused also to 
affirm "on the grounds that the words used were tantamount to an oath". (35) The 
Presbyterians though, who, like Love, had kept the faith, and had facilitated the return 
of the Stuart monarchy, enjoyed only a Pyrrhic victory. They "naturally assumed that 
toleration would be extended to them.. .they were betrayed.. .the responsibility lay with 
the majority of the House of Commons ... to them, all forms of Dissent - 
Presbyterian, Quaker and Baptist alike - appeared to be treasonable". (36) 
34. Of course, there were also those who became "tutors in... the black art of breaking all sacred 
bonds and obligations whatsoever, and that under the notation of satisfying the consciences 
and resolving the scruples of such who cannot swallow down this camel of perjury as easily as 
themselves". Thomas, "Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England" p. 44. 
35. Watts, The Dissenters p. 265. The words were changed in 1772 "to meet the objections of the 
more scrupulous Quakers." ibid p. 267. 
36. The New Cambridge Modern History Vol V pp. 302 and 306. 
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England's post-Restoration religious settlement was not determined in accordance with 
the Solemn League and Covenant. Nevertheless, religious diversity was at least 
assured; "the existence of dissent is what gave life and vitality to religious institutions. 
It meant that someone cared enough to struggle. Without that struggle religious 
institutions, or any others, would have atrophied. The religious life of England was 
remarkable because the dissenting spirit never really died." (37) 
Obligations under oath were brought into focus in Civil War England; oaths mattered. 
They mattered to members of Parliament in rebellion against the king; breach needed 
to be justified, and Hobbes' theories of an ambulatory obligation satisfied that need. 
It may be putting the claim too high to say that oaths mattered to Christopher Love, 
but there is no doubt that the Solemn League and Covenant was one oath which did. 
For him, the Solemn League and Covenant was an absolute obligation, and it was not 
possible to adapt that obligation to the changing political reality. It is unquestioned that 
oaths mattered to the Quakers, who were prepared to defy the State on what was for 
them an issue of conscience and obedience to God. A consideration of attitudes to 
perjury indicates an ambivalence by the State, and the legal system of which it was 
an arm, to obligations under oath. The State's attitude to perjured evidence and the 
Quakers at best calls into question its commitment to the truthfulness of evidence 
under oath. 
Notwithstanding there were individuals (and groups) to whom conscience mattered, 
it may be accepted that "as the national battle was fought out, so oaths of loyalty 
succeeded one another with bewildering frequency, until the currency was hopelessly 
debased". (38) In the last analysis, despite the "odour of sanctity" (39) accorded to 
37. J. W. Wilkes, "The Transformation of Dissent: a Review of the Change from the Seventeenth 
to the Eighteenth Centuries" from C. R. Cole & M. E. Moody, (ed.), The Dissenting Tradition 
(1975) pp. 118-9. 
38. Hill, Society and Puritanism p. 497. 
39. ibid p. 384. 
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obligations assumed under oath, and despite the "martyrdom" of Love and others, 
Hobbes' rather bleak conclusions seem accurate and justified. "Bonds, by which men 
are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for 
nothing is more easily broken than a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill 
consequence upon the rupture." (40) If one concedes the validity of Hobbes' 
contemporary conclusions, it follows that oath-taking in seventeenth-century England 
constituted "a doubtful security". (41) 
Hill's conclusions of a diminution in the centrality of oath-taking to seventeenth-century 
English life are correct, but with respect, he has not given a fully accurate account of 
attitudes to oaths and obligations thereunder. He has emphasised the result, but has 
understated the very real struggle of conscience. The struggle of the individual 
conscience was the same, whether that individual's conclusion was that obligations 
under oath were absolute or ambulatory. Any fully satisfying assessment of attitudes 
to obligations under oath in seventeenth-century England must take cognisance of the 
essential element of conscience and the belief in the immediacy and reality of God. 
40. Hobbes, Leviathan p. 192. 
41. Montagu, The Anatomy of Swearing  p. 64. 
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